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HEALTH CARE REFORM FOR THE
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: THE NEED
FOR A FEDERAL AND STATE PARTNERSHIP
INTRODUCTION
Since the death of President Clinton's Health Security Act in Sep-
tember of 1994, the United States' health care delivery system has been
in critical condition. The primary symptoms of the United States' failing
health care system-lack of access' and increasing cost2-are readily
apparent and the prognosis remains doubtful. Despite their having gath-
ered the country's finest public policy doctors, neither the executive nor
legislative branch of the federal government has found a cure. Further-
more, the President and Congress fundamentally disagree over the most
effective way to treat the symptoms of the United States' diseased health
care system. 3 While the "policy doctors" bicker about a prospective treat-
ment, their patient lies dying on the operating table.
At its core, the debate over national health care reform has devolved
into a battle between President Clinton's philosophy of "universal" ac-
cess and capitalist notions of a free market delivery system.4 Implemen-
tation of Clinton's Health Security Act (hereinafter the "HSA" or the
1 See Angelo A. Stio H, State Government: The Laboratory for National Health Care
Reform, 19 SrN HALL LEGIS. J. 322, 326 (1994). As of 1994, the United States was one of
only two industrialized nations (along with South Africa) that failed to provide its citizens with
some form of universal health care. See id.; see also George D. Lundberg, M.D., The Failure
of Organized Health System Reform-Now What?: Caveat Aeger-Let the Patient Beware,
273 JAMA 1539 (1995). Forty-one million people in the U.S. are living without insurance.
See Stio, supra, at 298. Fifty-six million citizens did not have adequate coverage in 1994 to
cover their health care costs. See id.
2 Jolee Ann Hancock, Comment, Diseased Federalism: State Health Care Laws Fall
Prey to ERISA Preemption, 25 CuMB. L. REv. 383 (1995).
3 President Clinton believes that health care is a right of all citizens, while the Republi-
can-dominated Congress is of the opinion that health care is a privilege. See H.R. REP. No.
103-601, pt. 2 at 2 (1994).
4 Clinton's goal of universal access presupposes the recognition of a fundamental lib-
erty interest in health care. Notwithstanding the Republican Party's unwillingness to recog-
nize such a liberty interest, it is unclear whether health care premised on the substantive Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment could survive judicial scrutiny.
The lengthy (1,342 pages) and complicated Health Security Act of 1993, proposed by
Clinton, would have been the first step toward the recognition of a fundamental right to health
care. See The Health Security Act, H.R. 3600, 103rd Cong. (1993). Its failure in Congress
suggests that the plan was "too radical, too complex, too intrusive, and too expensive" to be
enacted. See Ann Reilly Dowd, Fixing Clinton's Health Care Plan: The Key is a Go-Slow,
Market Based Approach that Ensures Access to Medical Care-But Dumps the President's
Reliance on Heavy-Handed Regulation, Tmm, Apr. 4, 1994, at 83.
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"Plan") called for extensive regulation and employer-mandates. 5 Subse-
quent to the rejection of the Clinton Plan, less ambitious proposals came
to the forefront of Congressional debate. Such plans, although poten-
tially effective as stop-gap measures, do not present a long term solution
to the problems of limited access and rising costs nor are they free of
bureaucratic red tape.6
But while federal policymakers have failed to find a panacea for the
United States' ailing health care delivery system, local politicians have
undertaken consideration of a variety of individual state cures. At the
state level, where constitutional stumbling blocks do not impede the goal
of universal coverage, 7 legislatures have been able to refocus their atten-
tion on providing care and not on justifying universal access. 8 Currently,
states are contending with the question of "how to pay for health care." 9
This note examines the failure of national health care reform in re-
cent years and the subsequent creation of effective state models for fund-
ing health care. Part I discusses the benefits of state solutions to the
national health care problem. Part I explores the history of federal ob-
stacles to such health care reform, concluding that the U.S. government
should allow greater flexibility for state action. In Part Ill, the legislative
reforms enacted in Hawaii, Florida, Oregon, and Tennessee-illustrative
of four distinct approaches to increasing access and controlling costs as-
sociated with health care-are outlined and discussed. Finally, Part IV
proposes a novel health care system that considers the lessons learned
from the failures of the federal government and capitalizes on the quali-
fied successes of the states.
I. THE BENEFITS OF INDIVIDUAL STATE SOLUTIONS TO
THE NATIONAL HEALTH CARE DILEMMA
A. ADDRESSING THE PROBLEM: STRUCTURAL PROBLEMS WITH THE
EXISTING UNITED STATES' HEALTH CARE DELIVERY SYSTEM
In 1994, during a debate over the Mitchell Reform Plan, then Senate
Majority Leader Robert Dole claimed "America has the best health care
5 Employer-mandates provide one alternative to funding health care; however, the in-
voluntary nature of such a plan makes it unpopular. This sort of funding has generally met
opposition from Republicans who favor a free market approach to health care, and specifically
from large employers, who would prefer to self-insure, and small employers who currently are
not compelled to provide health insurance to their employees. See infra note 38, at 547; see
also Dowd, supra note 4, at 83.
6 The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 [hereinafter HIPAA]
is one of these measures. For further explanation of the goals HIPAA is designed to do, see T.
David Cowart, A New Twist on Portability, SB51 ALI-ABA 805 (Feb. 13, 1997).
7 See infra Part IV.
8 See Dowd, supra note 4.
9 Thomas Bodenheimer, M.D., M.P.H. & Kevin Grumbach, M.D., Paying for Health
Care, 272 JAMA 634, 635 (1994).
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delivery system in the world."10 Based on this lofty status, it should
come as no surprise that the American health system is the most costly in
the developed world.1 But what is surprising is the rate at which the
United States continues to pour money into health care.12 In 1993, the
U.S. health care budget had ballooned to $900 billion (14.3 percent of
gross domestic product) and prior to that, in the 1980s, it was growing at
a rate of approximately 10.4 percent, more than twice the rate of inflation
for other goods and services. 13 Even more alarming is the fact that
notwithstanding the increase in spending, the number of uninsured rose
to almost forty billion Americans. 14 Thus, taken together these figures
challenge the validity of Senator Dole's remarks.
Such disquieting trends are the direct result of market failures that
arise out of the unique characteristics of the health care industry. Two
types of market failures account for escalating health care costs. First,
health insurance creates the problem of moral hazard. In this context,
moral hazard denotes the concept that a person with health insurance is
less likely to take measures to prevent illness and will instead incur more
health care costs when she becomes sick. 15 In an attempt to minimize
this effect, insurance companies generally require insureds to share the
cost of medical treatment through a co-payment. 16 However, co-pay-
ments, premiums and deductibles have been only marginally effective in
curbing health care spending by third party insurers. As a result, insurers
are forced to restrict coverage to low-risk individuals in order to cover
their reimbursement costs. 17 These restrictions ultimately lead to an in-
10 S. 103-231, § 1321 (1994). The Mitchell Reform Plan embraces managed competition
as the method for increasing access to health care at the lowest possible costs. In this way it is
similar to the Health Security Act. The primary difference is that the Mitchell plan is volun-
tary and for all employers, and it entities larger employers, with five hundred employees, the
opportunity to join alliances distinct from those organized for smaller employees. See Karen
A. Jordan, Managed Competition and Limited Choice of Providers: Countering Negative Per-
ceptions Through A Responsibility to Select Quality Network Physicians, 27 ARIZ. ST. L.J.
875, 881 (1995); cf. Florida Health Care and Insurance Reform Act of 1993, infra Part m.B.2.
I See Note, Universal Access to Health Care, 108 HI-ARv. L. REv. 1323, 1325 (1995).
"The United States spends twice as much per capita on health care as developed European
nations and nearly forty percent more than Canada, which has the world's second highest
spending on health care." Il
12 Id.
13 See id. at 1324.
14 See id. This amounted to 14.3 percent of the population. See id.
15 See id. at 1326.
16 Id. (citing JOSEPH P. NEwHOUSE, INSURANCE ExPERuaurrr GROUP, FREE FOR Au.?:
LESSONS FROM Tm RAND HALTH INsuRANcE EXPERMAENT 98 (1993)). Cost-sharing will re-
duce the frequency of outpatient services, but will not have a great effect on in-patient services
(because of the emergent nature of such care). Furthermore, cost-sharing is a "blunt instru-
ment" that reduces appropriate, as well as inappropriate, uses of services. NEwHoUsE, supra,
at 172-73.
17 See Note, supra note 11, at'1327.
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crease in the number of uninsured citizens. 8 This, in turn, exacerbates
the second type of market failure-the problem of free riders. One desir-
able effect of living in a humane society is that safety nets are created to
protect the less fortunate.19 However, there are consequences to this so-
cietal benevolence-a greater financial strain on providers and a greater
need to shift the cost burden onto insured beneficiaries. A "vicious cy-
cle" ensues in which the cost of services increases, forcing insurance
companies to restrict coverage, resulting in a greater number of unin-
sured, which requires providers to further shift costs, forcing insurance
companies to restrict coverage ad infinitum. 20
Accepting moral hazard and free-riding as the foundation of the
health care dilemma suggests that the dual goals of providing universal
access and lowering overall delivery costs may be coterminous. 21 In an
early attempt to stamp out the effects of moral hazard and free-riding, the
federal government created the Medicare22 and Medicaid 23 systems to
compensate providers that treated uninsured patients.24
These programs, which cover citizens on the basis of age, income
and disability, and generally serve the poor, elderly and disabled, have
not cured the problem of limited access. Instead, they have shifted the
financial burden and the accessibility of health care coverage onto a dif-
18 Id.
19 Note, The Impact of Medicaid Managed Care on the Uninsured, 110 HARv. L. Rv.
751,752 (1997) (arguing that Medicaid managed care undermines "urban public health 'safety
nets"'). The safety net is "the network of public hospitals and community health clinics that is
the provider of last resort for both uninsured and the most disadvantaged members of society."
Id. (footnote deleted).
20 See Note, supra note 11, at 1327.
21 Where access is limited, costs are often inflated because of the moral obligation of
caregivers to treat sick patients. In other words, physicians, in an attempt to subsidize the
treatment of the uninsured, raise costs for the insured, thus creating the "vicious cycle" noted
earlier. See id. at 1327 and accompanying text. It is hypothesized here that increasing cover-
age to the uninsured and uninsurable will broaden the base of payers to the health care pool,
drive down premiums, and create a healthier society.
22 Medicare is the common name for "Health Insurance for the Aged," a federal insur-
ance program for United States citizens over the age of sixty-five. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395-
1396(d) (1988 & Supp. mI 1991). Medicare consists of two parts: Part A - Hospital Insurance
Benefits for the Aged and Disabled, and Part B - Supplementing Medical Insurance Benefits
for the Aged and Disabled. The entire program is administered by the federal government.
See id.
23 Medicaid is the common name for "Grants to States for Medical Assistance Program,"
and provides medical assistance to the poor, disabled, aged, and minor dependent children and
their parents. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396-1396(u) (1988 & Supp. 1111991). Medicaid is funded in
part by both the federal and state governments, and is administered by the state, in accordance
with federal regulations. See James E. Holloway, ERISA, Preemption and Comprehensive
Federal Health Care: A Call for "Cooperative Federalism" to Preserve the States' Role in
Formulating Health Care Policy, 16 CAMPBELL L. RaV. 405, 414 (1995).
24 See Hancock, supra note 2, at 402.
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ferent group-the working poor.25 The simultaneous rise in both the
number of uninsured Americans and health care costs, forced the federal
government to recognize that these plans alone were insufficient to create
universal coverage. Consequently, politicians turned their attentions to
health care reform at both the state and federal levels.
B. NATIONAL SOLUTIONs ARE INEFFECTIVE
1. The Failure of President Clinton's Health Security Act
The United States is one of only two industrialized nations in the
world that does not provide universal access to health care.26 This alone
suggests that there are factors that make the delivery of health care in the
U.S. too complex to administer on a national scale. A foray into recent
attempts to devise a national health care policy to achieve universal ac-
cess and cost containment, without sacrificing quality of care, will
demonstrate the difficulties inherent in creating such a national plan.
At the federal level, the spectrum of health care policies that might
be promulgated to achieve the aforementioned goals range from imple-
mentation of a single payer system2 7 to complete deregulation of the ex-
isting health care market. At each extreme, however, the prospects for
successful implementation seem bleak.28 Consequently, most of the fed-
eral reform that has been proposed has occupied a compromise position
between the two extremes. Congress rejected Clinton's HSA, a compre-
hensive bill to reform the nation's health care delivery system, and com-
mentators have since suggested numerous reasons for its failure, positing
both substantive and procedural criticisms.29
25 When Medicare and Medicaid were implemented, the reduced reimbursement rates
funded by the federal government caused providers to shift costs to other payers. The result of
this cost-shifting placed the burden of paying their medical costs on the rest of society. This
increase in insurance premiums raised the marginal cost of health insurance, forcing low-
income (above the federal poverty level) working families to forego their insurance.
One study of 1500 individuals demonstrated that low-income patients fared better under a
fee-for-service model of health care, while individuals in the top forty percent of the income
distribution fared better under MCO care. See generally Elizabeth M. Sloss et al., Effects of a
Health Maintenance Organization Physiological Health: Results from a Randomized Trial,
106 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 130 (1987); see also DAVID H4LsTru' & SmiFa WOoLHAN-
DLER, THm NATIONAL HEALTH PROGRAM BOOK 2330 (1994) (claiming that managed care
works worst for those who are poor and ill).
26 See Stio, supra note 1, at 324-26.
27 See Jason B. Saunders, International Health Care: Will the United States Ever Adopt
Health Care for All? A Comparison Between Proposed United States Approaches to Health
Care and the Single Source Financing Systems of Denmark and the Netherlands, 18 SUFFOLK
TRANSNAT'L L. REv. 711 (1995) (advocating that the United States should adopt a single payer
system).
28 See H. Richard Beresford, The Health Securities Act: Coercion and Distrust for the
Market, 79 CORNELL L. REv. 1405, 1415-16 (1994).
29 This paper only examines the substantive problems with the HSA. See generally Jerry
L. Mashaw & Theodore R. Marmor, The State as the Guarantor of Social Welfare: A Struc-
1998]
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Much of the substantive criticism of the HSA resonated from three
doctrinal camps. The most serious criticism of the Clinton Plan is that it
requires too much goyernmental oversight.30 The major components of
the Plan were regional purchasing alliances, 31 which would interact with
organized medical service providers32 to establish standard levels of pre-
miums for all purchasers regardless of age, sex, or health. Overhauling
the existing system to the extent proposed by the HSA would require
federal oversight of both of the market players (purchasing alliances and
medical providers) as well as maintenance of a federal fund for the un-
employed. Such regulation would involve market price controls (includ-
ing capitation),33 quality controls,34 service controls,35 and information
controls, 36 to name a few. As such, it is not surprising that in a nation
where only two out of every ten citizens believe that the government
"will do the right thing most of the time,"37 skepticism over a govern-
ment-administered health delivery system persists.
A second criticism of the HSA is that such "socialization" of
medicine would result in decreased quality of service.38 Allowing the
government to allocate benefits and payments necessarily eliminates
most of the freedom to contract in the area of medical services. Quality
suffers when the government attempts to provide universal access with-
out carefully considering the choice and breadth of services for those it
intends to insure.39
tural Perspective on Contemporary American Debates on Medical Care Reform, in PROFES-
SIONS, THE PRODUCrION OF HEALTH CARE AND THE STATE 2 (Patricia Days et al. eds., 1995)
(analyzing the procedural deficiencies which led to the Plan's demise); see also W. John
Thomas, The Clinton Health Care Reform Plan: A Failed Dramatic Presentation, 7 STAN. L.
& POL'Y REv. 83 (1996).
30 See R. Shep Melnick, Federalism and the New Rights, 14 YALE J. ON REG. 325, 342
(1996). "In 1994 President Clinton's health care proposal foundered on the shoals of public
fear of government bureaucracy." Id.
31 See Sylvia F. Kleinman & John Glasel, The Clinton Health Plan: We Deserved Better,
21 N.Y.U. Rv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 241, 244 (1994-95). These alliances were developed by
employer-mandates, requiring all employers to participate, without regard for alternative forms
of employment insurance, or employee self-insurance. See infra notes 179-86 and accompany-
ing text; see also H.R. 3600 §§ 6122, 6123 (1993); cf. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 408.702 (1993)
(delineating the contours of the Florida purchasing alliances).
32 See Beresford, supra note 28, at 1407-10. Such providers were required to meet a
federal minimum of comprehensive benefits. See id.
33 See H.R. 3600, § 1002 (1993).
34 See id. §§ 1101(a), 1111-28.
35 See id. §§ 1402-1403.
36 See Kleinman & Glasel, supra note 31, at 245.
37 Melnick, supra note 30, at 342.
38 Judith M. Rosenberg & David T. Zaring, Managing Medicaid Waivers: Section 1115
and State Health Care Reform, 32 HARv. J. ON LEns. 545, 547-48 (1995) (stating that man-
aged care waivers were not the intention of § 1115 and will lead to a poorer quality of care).
39 See id.
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The Clinton Plan, however, is not alone in drawing criticism. Simi-
lar criticism has been lodged against state-created health plans as well.
Thus, it may not be the nature of federal regulation, specifically, that
causes a decrease in the quality of services, but rather, the nature of gov-
ernmental regulation generally, that results in a lower level of care. It
was in this context that Judith Rosenberg and David Zaring condemned
the Clinton Administration's decision to "actively facilitate the approval
of Section 1115 waivers. 40
A third substantive criticism of Clinton's plan is that it demands a
change in doctrinal notions of constitutional entitlement. The Supreme
Court has explicitly held that there is no fundamental right to health
care41 nor is the United States obligated to provide health care to its
citizens. This may be a reflection of prevailing notions of the division of
government at the time. "In the interest of state autonomy, federalism,
and the already developing local policies, the framers ... did not provide
for health care in the Constitution." 42
The debate over interpreting the Constitution to include a positive
right to government-provided health care is not uniquely American. In
fact, the constitutions of over thirty other nations guarantee health care to
their citizens.43 In light of this international recognition of health care as
a fundamental right, proponents of constitutional recognition of such a
right cite international law as a rationale.44 Other commentators use
communitarian principals to argue the existence of a constitutional right
to health care.45 Yet, another commentator, Professor Wendy Parmet,
asserts that a constitutional right ought to be recognized because at the
time the Constitution was written states were obliged to provide for the
health and welfare of their citizens in return for their obedience.46
Despite the existence of convincing arguments in support of the rec-
ognition of health care as a constitutional entitlement, there are equally
compelling practical arguments for not recognizing such a right. R. Shep
Melnick has noted four factors, which cast doubt upon both the legisla-
40 1&
41 See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 318 (1980); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 469
(1977) (holding that medical care is not a fundamental interest).
42 Saunders, supra note 27, at 719.
43 See Melnick, supra note 30, at 325 n.1.
44 See id. at 742.
45 See Note, supra note 11, at 1327-28. Under communitarian analysis, the central ques-
tion is whether "Universal Access to Health Care is more just than the current market-based
distribution of health insurance.. ." and the answer, of course, is yes. l at 1328.
46 Wendy E. Parmet, Health Care and the Constitution: Public Health and the Role of
the States in the Framing Era, 20 HASTNaGS CONST. L.Q. 267 (1993). Parmet employed social
contract theory to explain the relationship between the individual and the state, which required
the state to provide the individual protection (including medical care). Id. at 322.
19981
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tive and judicial creation of a right to health care.47 The first two-the
current composition of the Rehnquist Court and the Republican Con-
gress-are procedural realities that work against the recognition of a
constitutional right.48 The latter two factors established by Melnick-the
public's lack of confidence in the government 49 and the resurgence of
state-run programs 5 0 -are not so much condemnations of a constitutional
right to health care as they are reasons to bifurcate the health care deliv-
ery system.5 1 In addition, James Holloway has outlined the negative im-
pact that federal health care regulation would have on federalism
generally.5 2
In light of the many practical concerns regarding federally adminis-
tered national health care programs, it remains unlikely that a compre-
hensive policy will be established in the near future. This, however, does
not mean that the federal government must entirely remove itself from
the arena of promulgation and administration of health care reform.
2. The Appropriate Role for the Federal Government
The federal government should participate in the administration of
health care "with authority, as opposed to exclusive control. '53 In that
regard, the federal government may set minimum standards for health
care services, and reasonable cost control devices. 54 It should oversee
the integration of Medicaid into state health programs and require states
to promulgate policies that will ensure that all employed, low income,
uninsured workers have access to a basic health care package, at little or
no cost.55 To the extent that the above proposal allows the federal gov-
47 Melnick, supra note 30, at 339-45. Although many commentators suggest that univer-
sal access to health care should be a moral imperative, they also agree that the creation of a
constitutional right (through either of these mechanisms) is inappropriate, and potentially
dangerous.
48 See id. at 342.
49 See supra Part I.B.
50 See infra Part I.C.
51 Melnick, supra note 30, at 342.
52 Holloway, supra note 23, at 408. Federal health care regulation requires a great deal
of state law preemption, which in turn would "accelerate the decline of federalism by restrict-
ing the states' ability to concern themselves with local medical care needs and to use local
employment-based resources in formulating a comprehensive state health care policy." Id. at
408.
53 Id at 453.
54 Possible components could include: 1) uniform benefits packages; 2) accountable
health care plans that compete at the local level; and 3) public sponsorship of individuals and
small employers. See James B. Kenny & Sean Sullivan, Health Care Reform: National, State
and Local Direction, 18 EMPLOYEE BENEFITs J. 41 (1993).
55 The cost of insuring this group should be placed either on the state/federal Medicaid
bill, or in the hands of employers, who may or may not receive tax credits for insuring their
employees. One author writes that "[simall and large businesses should not be permitted to
externalize (to Medicaid and other programs) the costs of health care for uninsured, employed,
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eminent to facilitate, rather than exclusively govern, the health care de-
livery system of the states, it will produce a more effective means of
achieving the national goals of universal coverage and reasonable
costs. 56 One commentator has called this collaborative effort "coopera-
tive federalism. '57
C. STATE SOLUTIONS WILL SOLVE THE HEALTH CAPE CRIsis
1. States are Self-Interested Parties
States are major purchasers of health care services spending nearly
20 percent of their budgets on health care in fiscal year 1992.58 Due to
this uncontrollable rise in health care costs59 and the inability of the fed-
eral government to curb spending on medical care,60 states have pro-
posed a great deal of health care legislation over the past three decades.6 1
In addition, increased state expenditures on health care have decreased
the amount of money that states have been able to allocate to other areas
(i.e. education, infrastructure and tax relief).62 For these reasons, states
have placed health care at the top of their local agendas. 63
The states' familiarity with issues concerning local health care de-
livery dictates that they be the primary drivers of comprehensive health
care reform across the nation. Additional evidence of the necessity for
state-administered reform can be gleaned from public opinion polls re-
garding local government 64 and from the spectrum of legislative reforms
low income workers, and nonworkers if these businesses are subject to employer-sponsored
health care programs." Holloway, supra note 23, at 453. However, to the extent that such a
program of federal employer mandates limits the ability of a state to implement a system
specific to its own needs, it suffers from the same problems of overbreadth that have con-
demned other federal health care initiatives.
56 See Holloway, supra note 23, at 453.
57 Id. at 405, 452-54.
58 Id. "Health care is 'the single most important cost driver for states."' NATIONAL As-
SOCIATION OF STATE BUDGEr OFIcERs, 1992 EXPENDrrTURE REPORT 2 (1993). According to
NASBO, Medicaid accounts for "about 17 percent of all state spending in fiscal 1992." NA-
TIONAL AssoCIATION OF STATE BUDGET OFFICFRS, FIsCAL SURVEY OF THE STATES: APRIL
1993 61 (1993).
59 See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
60 See supra note 25 and accompanying text; see also supra note 17.
61 See Holloway, supra note 23, at 415. In 1993, forty-eight state legislatures considered
health care reform; see John K. Iglehart, Health Care Reform the State, 330 NEw ENG. J. MED.
75 (1994).
62 NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF STATE BUDGET OFiFiCs, FISCAL SURVEY OF THE STATES:
OCrOBER 1992 32 (1992) (stating that health care costs make it difficult to fund other
priorities).
63 See Fernando R. LaGuarda, Federalism Myth: States as Laboratories of Health Care
Reform, 82 GEO. L.J. 159 (1993). Many observers considered the Pennsylvania election of
Harris Wofford to the U.S. Senate a sign that voters were sending a message to government to
put health care at the top of the political agenda. See id. at 171 n.64 (citing HALr POLICY
REFORM iN AMERICA: INNOVATIONS FROM TE STATES xii (Howard M. Leichter ed., 1992)).
64 See Melnick, supra note 30, at 342.
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that have been implemented to date.65 States have implemented pro-
grams mandating employers to provide health insurance to their employ-
ees, 66 rationing medical services to the poor, 67 enlarging purchasing
pools, 68 expanding Medicaid to cover all uninsured residents at or below
the federal poverty level,69 and providing improved benefits packages for
children, 70 among other reforms. In each instance, the states have met
with varying levels of success in their attempts to increase coverage and
decrease costs, despite formidable federal obstacles.7 1 Initial successes
in some states promise to spawn even greater success for future state
health care reform, particularly in the absence of federal restrictions. 72
In addition to the states' interest in controlling the cost of health
care, states are also interested in assuring that their citizens get a compre-
hensive health care package that comports with the specific concerns of
the local populous. States are generally concerned about the welfare of
their residents. The plight of the uninsured and underinsured has been
brought to the fore in recent years, and questions about the adequacy of
access for all state residents have spurred states into action.73 It is, there-
fore, imperative that states be given the leeway necessary to achieve in-
creased, if not universal, access.
2. Federalism Demands State Participation
Maintaining federalism as it was conceived of by the Framers of the
Constitution is a second significant legal reason for allowing state regula-
tion of health care reform. Indeed, "[t]he question of the relation of the
states to the federal government is the cardinal question of our constitu-
tional system."'7 4 In its original form, the political structure of the United
States envisioned a balance of power between the federal government
and the states, protected by the even hand of the judiciary. In recent
years, however, the power of the states to influence national policy has
65 See infra Part IV.
66 See infra Part IV.A.
67 See infra Part IV.B.
68 See infra Part IV.C.
69 See infra Part IV.D.
70 See Minnesota Health Rights Act, Ch. 549, art. 1, 1, 1992 Minn. Laws 1487 (codified
at MINN. STAT. § 62J.015 (1992)); Eric H. Chadwick, Minnesotacare: Workable Finance or
Just Wishfid Thinking?, 19 WM. MrrcHELL L. REv. 961 (1993).
71 See infra Part III.
72 See Colleen M. Grogan, Hope in Federalism? What Can the States Do and What Are
They Likely to Do?, 20 J. HEATH POL. POL'Y & L. 477 (1995) (suggesting the future of state
health care reform).
73 See Holloway, supra note 23, at 422.
74 WOODROW WILSON, CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT 173 (1908).
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markedly decreased,75 leaving only a procedural framework where feder-
alism once stood as a powerful substantive force.76
James Holloway argues that the implementation of a federal health
care policy promises to preempt more state policy than ERISA currently
does.77 Holloway's concern is that "in providing a minimum standard
and some uniformity, [a comprehensive national health care policy] will
have to control health care and health-related interests which are inter-
twined with numerous fields of state law and public policy ... result[ing]
in the undermining of federalism. '78
Another argument in favor of preserving federalism revisits Profes-
sor Parmet's theory about national policy at the time of the Constitu-
tion.79 Parmet, in advocating a governmental obligation to provide
health care, recognized that the obligation rested with the states and not
the federal government.80 Under this interpretation, wresting this power
away from the states would be constitutionally unjust. Additionally,
states have already accepted the role of providing for the health and wel-
fare of their citizens; thus, there is no need to recognize a constitutional
obligation to achieve the same end, nor is there a need for federal inter-
ference in the administration of such policy. State control of health care
reform is supported by constitutional notions of federalism, practical no-
tions of administrability, and economic notions of efficiency.
II. FEDERAL OBSTACLES IMPEDE THE DEVELOPMENT OF
STATE SOLUTIONS
Where state health care plans restructure the delivery and funding of
health care to the indigent and the unemployed, they conflict with federal
employment law and Medicaid. In these instances, many of the state-
sponsored proposals have been preempted by the procedural rules of ER-
ISA 81 and/or Medicaid. The following section will discuss the impact of
ERISA and Medicaid on the implementation of state health care pro-
grams in the past and the program's need for greater freedom in the
future.
75 See Holloway, supra note 23, at 446. Cf. Melnick, supra note 30, at 344 (stating that
after a period of decline in the 1970s and 1980s, the states have experienced a resurgence in
the 1990s).
76 See Holloway, supra note 23, at 451.
77 See id. at 445-51.
78 Id. at 451.
79 See Parmet, supra note 46 and accompanying text.
80 See id. at 322.
81 ERISA is the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974. See 120 Cong. Rec.
29216, 29963 (1974); G. Waldon Snyder, Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974,
11 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 219, 224 (1975).
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A. ERISA PREEMPTION
The impact of ERISA on state health care policy has been deleteri-
ous. In the late 1970s, when state laws requiring employers to provide
health insurance to employees were challenged, this issue came to a
head.82 Whether Congress actually created ERISA as an obstacle to
health care reform is doubtful, at best.83 It is well established that the
original purpose of ERISA was to protect employee pensions. 84 To ac-
complish this task, ERISA regulates the administration of employee
health care benefits, among other things,8 5 and provides a regulatory
framework for the administration of employee benefit plans among the
states. 86 Through a broad interpretation of the ERISA preemption
clause,8 7 courts have been able to strike down nearly all state attempts at
comprehensive health care regulation. 88 As a consequence, states are
82 See Hancock, supra note 2, at 403. The most significant challenge occurred in Stan-
dard Oil Company v. Agsalud. 454 U.S. 801 (1981), affig mem. 633 F.2d 760 (9th Cir. 1980).
See Hancock, supra note 2, at 404.
83 See Hancock, supra note 2, at 404. "The Senate conferees did not discuss the effect of
preemption with their associates who dealt with the health issues. Senator Bentsen claimed
that the issue 'did not come before us on our hearing on the Finance Committee."' Id. at 405
(citing ERISA Improvement Act of 1978: Joint Hearing Before the Committee on Human Re-
sources and the Commity on Finance, 95th Cong. 266 (1978)).
However, "the Ninth Circuit recognized that 'ERISA contains one of the broadest pre-
emption clauses ever enacted by Congress."' Devon P. Groves, ERISA Waivers and State
Health Care Reform, 28 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PRoBs. 609, 618 (1995) (quoting Evans v. Safeco
Life Ins. Co., 916 F.2d 1437, 1439 (9th Cir. 1990)).
84 See Groves, supra note 83, at 615.
85 Under ERISA states may not: 1) set minimum benefits standards for all health cover-
age within their borders; 2) require employers to pay a minimum percentage of employee
premiums; 3) mandate that employers provide health insurance; or 4) tax the premium of self
insured plans or the payments they make to pay for the care of people without insurance. See
Richard A. Knox, Health Reform Fizzling in States: Legal, Political Obstacles Block Local
Efforts, Officials Say, BosToN GLOBE, July 17, 1994, at 1.
86 See generally Holloway, supra note 23, at 416-17, 419-20. See supra note 84 (for an
explanation of 29 U.S.C. § 1144); see also Groves, supra note 83, at 416 n.53 (quoting Senator
Harrison A. Williams, Jr. (D-NJ): "[section 1144 (a) is] intended to preempt the field for
Federal regulations, thus eliminating the threat of conflicting or inconsistent state and local
regulations of employee benefit plans." 120 CONG. Rc. 29,933 (1974).
87 The ERISA preemption clause is embodied in 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1994). This sec-
tion provides that:
(a) Supersedure; effective date: Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section,
the provisions of this subchapter and subchapter I of this chapter shall supersede
any and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee
benefit plan described in section 1003(a) of this rifle and not exempt under section
1003(b) of this title. This section shall take effect on January 1, 1975.
Id.
88 See Holloway, supra note 23, at 410-11. Most state health care regulation either af-
fects or at least relates to employee benefit plans, and as a result must fall under the blanket
distinction of the preemption clause. Id.
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forced to promulgate creative 89 health care legislation to avoid potential
ERISA conflicts. 90
Still, no matter how creative a state is, ERISA preemption will gen-
erally allow only tangential changes in the health care delivery system.91
Moreover, because ERISA allows employers to maintain common law
discretion regarding whether and to what extent they will offer their em-
ployees health care benefits, it forces states to rely on such employers'
voluntary accessions to public policy to effectuate any significant
change.92 Under the existing system, the success of public policy reform
is inseparably tied to private interests, and frustration of legislative goals
seems inevitable. 93
The most significant frustration experienced by the states is the in-
ability to regulate the decision-making of large employers. 94 Because
large corporations comprise nearly two-thirds of the national work force,
when they opt out of statewide schemes95 small companies and the self
employed are forced to join higher risk pools and pay larger premiums.96
Large employers can further frustrate a state's effort to finance health
care because ERISA allows them to avoid paying taxes on their self-
insurance plans. 97 In some cases, though, indirect taxes, which may ac-
89 For instance, the Supreme Court recognized a distinction between state law mandating
particular medical benefits and state law requiring insurance. Metropolitan Life v. Massachu-
setts, 471 U.S. 724, 743 (1985). Mandatory medical benefits (i.e. mental health benefits),
because they regulate insurance providers, and not employers, would not be preempted despite
the fact that mandated medical insurance (which effectively regulates employers) remained
illegal. See id.
90 See Holloway, supra note 23, at 422-38 (discussing state regulations which are and are
not preempted by ERISA).
91 See id. Generally, states may set minimum benefit levels, restrict the cancellation of
coverage due to claims, provide for portability between providers, mandate that insurance
companies cover any group that applies, and set upper and lower limits for premiums. See
Groves, supra note 83, at 625.
92 See Holloway, supra note 23, at 443. State health care reform depends on: 1) whether
an employer will grant health care benefits under its self-funded plan; 2) whether employers
will voluntarily purchase commercial insurance subject to mandated-benefits regulation; 3)
whether the federal government will grant states an exception to or exemption from section
1144(a); and 4) whether the federal government will continue to subsidize medical care and
assistance programs (i.e. Medicaid, etc.). See id. at 443-44.
93 In other words, whenever the effectiveness of public policy necessarily relies on the
accessions of private interest groups, the achievement of stated goals is indirect, with the
interest group ultimately in control of whether or not the state reaches its goals.
94 See Stio, supra note 1, at 336.
95 A large corporation may opt out of state regulation by self-insuring. See Groves,
supra note 83, at 625.
96 See Stio, supra note 1, at 336.
* 97 See id. This result is exacerbated when states promulgate mandated benefits, because
self-insured large corporations may negotiate the mandated benefit out of their insurance pack-
age, thus forcing all other individual purchasers to subsidize the high risk pool. The dual
consequences of this exemption are frustration of state policy objectives and higher premiums
for individual insurance purchasers. See id. at 337 n.51.
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tually carry through to employers covered by ERISA, have been upheld
because of their negligible burden on the administration of ERISA plans
and "because the economic impact on ERISA plans [i]s tenuous, remote
and peripheral." 98
Congress has been reluctant to restructure the ERISA preemption to
allow states to implement health care reform because of the perceived
need for uniformity in employment law.99 As a result of Congress's de-
cision to favor federal employment law over health care policy, states
must continue to find ways to regulate health care without triggering ER-
ISA preemption of employers. The difficulty of this task has stalled im-
portant reforms in the delivery of health care and will continue to do so
until either Congress or the Supreme Court grant states the ERISA ex-
emption necessary to implement meaningful change.
B. MEDICAID PREEMPTION
Medicaid is a jointly-funded, state-administered federal program
that provides health care to the indigent.' ° ° The federal government es-
tablished broad guidelines 1° ' under which states are allowed to structure
Medicaid programs specific to the needs of their citizens. Nevertheless,
because of an inability to meet certain eligibility criteria, many of the
targeted residents are not eligible for Medicaid assistance.' 0 2 The result-
ing ineffectiveness of Medicaid programs has increased the states' will-
98 Groves, supra note 83, at 627 n.99 (quoting Boyle v. Anderson, 849 F. Supp. 1307 (D.
Minn. 1994)). Similarly, New York's eleven percent tax on rates to patients covered by com-
mercial insurance has been allowed. See id.; see also New York State Conference of Blue
Cross & Blue Shield v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645 (1995) (unanimous opinion holding
that ERISA does not preempt a New York rate-setting law that imposes surcharges on hospital
bills paid by commercial insurers and certain self-funders but not on those paid by Blue Cross
& Blue Shield plans); DeBuono v. NYSA-IIA Medical and Clinical Services Fund, 520 U.S.
806 (1997). "The law was designed to help Blue Cross & Blue Shield, which insures a
broader array of patients, compete more effectively with commercial insurers." Jesselyn Alicia
Brown, ERISA and State Health Care Reform: Roadblock or Scapegoat?, 13 YALE L. & PoL'Y
REv. 339, 343 (1995). See generally Stio, supra note I (proposing that under the Travelers
decision, states do not necessarily need relief from ERISA preemption, but rather clarification
of precisely what ERISA preempts).
99 See Stio, supra note 1, at 338. Companies that are protected by ERISA preemption
are not forced to comply with fifty different sets of state insurance regulations. See id. at 338
n.57. "Members of Congress believe that 'if we have each state doing its own thing, we are
going to have an unworkable maze' for those employers that operate in several states." Id.
Further, "it is unreasonable to expect employers to invest in efficiently managing benefits
when the employer's role in covering workers is subject to ever changing political factions in
each state." Id.
100 See Vernellia Randall et al., Section 1115 Medicaid Waivers: Critiquing the State
Applications, 26 SETON HALL L. Rnv. 1069, 1070 (1996).
101 These guidelines include: amount, duration, scope of services, eligibility, and payment
structures. See id.
102 See Randall, supra note 100, at 1072. Most of the ineligible citizens have difficulty
meeting the Aid for Dependent Children criteria of Medicaid. The problem has been exacer-
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ingness to experiment with demonstration projects.' 0 3 However, such
experimentation is not easy. In order for a state to experiment with
health care, it must obtain a Medicaid waiver. The most typical type of
Medicaid waiver is a section 1115 demonstration waiver. 10 4 Section
1115 of the Social Security Act of 1935105 states that:
(a) In the case of any experimental, pilot, or demonstra-
tion project which, in the judgment of the Secretary, is
likely to assist in promoting the objectives of [the
Act] ...
(1) the Secretary may waive compliance with any of
the requirements of [various sections of the Act] ...
to the extent and for the period he finds necessary to
enable such State or States to carry out the
project ...106
The language of section 1115 does not provide the Secretary of the
Department of Health and Human Services ("HHS") guidance about the
manner in which each state proposal should be evaluated. As a result, a
great deal of debate arose amongst scholars' 0 7 and politicians (both fed-
eral and state)108 over how waiver review should be undertaken. Cur-
rently, demonstration waivers are granted to programs that are beyond
the scope of the waiver rationale, as it was originally conceived.' 0 9 This
bated by states failing to adjust income eligibility criteria in consonance with the rate of infla-
tion. See id.
103 See id. at 1073. "By April 1995, six states had received [Medicaid] waivers, seven
applications were pending, and other proposals were being drafted." Id. The majority of state
waiver programs require participants to enroll in managed care and expand the eligibility crite-
ria of Medicaid. See id. at 1074.
104 President John F. Kennedy was the driving force behind the creation of the section
1115 waiver in 1962. The waiver was originally created to permit experimentation with all
types of welfare programs existing and not-yet developed (i.e., Medicaid). See Rosenberg &
Zaring, supra note 38, at 546-47.
105 42 U.S.C. § 1315 (1988).
106 Id. The Senate report pertaining to the section recognized that federal guidelines
"often stand in the way of experimental projects designed to test out new ideas and ways of
dealing with the problems of public welfare recipients." S. REP. No. 87-1589, at 1961 (1962).
107 See Susan Bennett & Kathleen Sullivan, Disentitling the Poor: Waivers and Welfare
"Reform," 26 U. MICH. J.L. REFoRm 741 (1993) (recommending a set of procedures that is
consistent with the core values of the Aid to Families with Dependent Children for evaluating
waiver requests); Elizabeth Andersen, Administering Health Care: Lessons for the Health
Care Financing Administration's Waiver Policy-Making, 10 J.L. & POL. 215 (1994) (arguing
that criticism of the HCFA's policy-making is the result of the agency's failure to calibrate its
waiver process); Rosenberg & Zaring, supra note 38 (stating that managed care waivers were
not the intention of Section 1115 and will lead to a poorer quality of care).
108 See Andersen, supra note 107, at 219 (discussing the inherent conflict that arises from
state administration of a federally-funded program).
109 See id. at 226. "Since the late 1970s, cost-conscious states have, in the guise of sec-
tion 1115 demonstration applications asked the federal government for permission to imple-
ment long-term, comprehensive health care reform." Id. at 229.
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expansive interpretation of section 1115 demands that greater scrutiny be
applied by the Secretary of HHS before approving a state proposal.
The first step in the waiver process requires a state to submit a de-
tailed proposal to HHS delineating the mandates it would like waived. 110
A detailed discussion of the program's cost (to both the state and federal
government), the relevant laws, and the anticipated effect on former and
future beneficiaries of Medicaid should be included in the proposal. 1 '1
The second step involves the comprehensive review of the waiver
by the Health Care Financing Agency (hereinafter HFCA) of the HHS.
A technical review panel convenes to score the proposal's methodology
and design, objectives, expected cost and returns, and the applicant's
knowledge and experience in administering such reform."12 Depending
on this score, the panel will recommend that HHS either approve or re-
ject the plan, or condition approval on certain necessary changes. 113 At
that point, the proposal is delivered to the HCFA's Office of Research
and Development, which incorporates the panel's recommendation and
an independent review into a decision memorandum forwarded to the
agency's Administrator, who has ultimate discretion. 114 Notwithstanding
technicalities, which require even more stringent review,115 this process
is extremely cumbersome and time-consuming. It may take anywhere
from a few months to two years 1 6 and may require many drafts of the
proposal before it obtains HFCA approval.
The problem with the section 1115 waiver, as it is employed cur-
rently, is that in the absence of comprehensive federal health care reform,
states are not provided with enough information to efficiently promulgate
demonstration proposals. State proposals are therefore written with a
blind eye toward specific federal concerns. In some cases, state interests
Originally, the Secretary of HHS was not required to consider the effects on beneficiaries
or costs when evaluating a Medicaid program. Recently, however, "access to health care pro-
grams, quality of care, and budgetary concerns have emerged as prominent factors of waiver
decision-making." Id. at 226.
110 See Rosenberg & Zaring, supra note 38, at 547.
111 Id.
112 See id. at 548. Also considered are risks to the potential beneficiaries of the program.
See id.
113 See id. at 547.
114 See id.
115 A demonstration project, which affects more than three hundred Medicaid recipients
and anticipates federal costs in excess of one million dollars, requires the additional approval
of the HHS Assistant Secretary for Management and Budget and the White House Office of
Management and Budget (OMB). These proposals, because of their potential burden on fed-
eral funds, often require strict budget-neutrality. See id.
116 See Andersen, supra note 107, at 22; cf Bennett & Sullivan, supra note 107, at 743
("waivers [are] granted relatively quickly, sometimes with thirty days of the state request.").
The short evaluation period enunciated by Bennett may have been a function of President
Bush's push for health care reform. See Michael Wiseman, Welfare Reform in the States: The
Bush Legacy, FOCUS, Spring 1993, at 23-25.
HEALTH CARE RFFORM
will encompass many of the same concerns held by the federal govern-
ment. More often than not, however, strict (and time-consuming) scru-
tiny of the proposal will be necessary to ensure that federal funds and
interests do not become completely subverted. As such, efficiency de-
mands that the federal government explicitly state its non-fiscal interests,
or that it scrutinize state proposals with regard only to cost.
11. CASE STUDIES OF FOUR STATE PLANS FOR DELIVERY
AND FINANCING OF HEALTH CARE
A. HAwAII PLAN117
Hawaii utilizes employer mandates to achieve almost universal
health care coverage. This is the only state that can effectively employ
such a method because its health care delivery system was devised in
1974, prior to the passage of ERISA. Thus, Hawaii was able to gain a
waiver for its health care policy, albeit a limited one. Hawaii is not al-
lowed to implement changes to the policy after 1974.118
B. OREGoN PLAN
1. Brief History of Health Care in Oregon Prior to the Oregon
Health Plan
In Oregon, the legislature was confronted with the typical health
care dilemma of escalating costs and decreasing access. As a result, the
state legislature promulgated a health plan that has been deemed among
the most controversial in the country.119 The Oregon Health Plan, which
finally received the Medicaid waivers necessary for implementation on
March 19, 1993, demanded a shift in fundamental values in order to gain
widespread acceptance as a viable system for delivering health care.' 20
The Health Plan is comprised of seven pieces of legislation enacted
in 1987, 1989 and 1991 with the intention of providing universal access
at competitive costs. 121 In order for the Oregon plan to be fully imple-
mented, the federal government had to grant Medicaid waivers allowing
the state to deviate from the mandates of national health policy.122 Sec-
117 See generally Stio, supra note 1; LaGuarda, supra note 63.
118 Stio, supra note 1, at 350.
119 See id. at 359.
120 See Catherine Grace Vanchiere, Stalled on the Road to Health Care Reform: An Anal-
ysis of the Initial Impediments to the Oregon Demonstration Project, 10 J. CorrEmp. HEALTH.
L. & POL'Y 405 (1994) (citing Daniel Callahan, Rationing Medical Progress-The Way to
Affordable Health Care, 322 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1810, 1810-11 (1990)).
121 See Stio, supra note 1, at 359.
122 See supra Part 1I.B. Prior to any experimentation with Medicaid, a state must submit
a request for waiver to the Secretary of the Department of Health & Human Services for
permission to waive the requirements of the Social Securities Act. 42 U.S.C. § 1315(3)(a)
(1993).
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retary of HHS Louis W. Sullivan initially rejected this proposal because
it conflicted with the Americans with Disabilities Act.12 3 Ultimately, af-
ter working in close connection with the Health Care Financing Adminis-
tration ("HCFA"), the Oregon legislature was able to make the changes
necessary to receive the desired waivers. 124
During the time in which the Oregon legislature promulgated and
refined its health plan, the State was faced with 400,000 uninsured resi-
dents under the age of sixty-five, 125 and a Medicaid bill that had grown
by almost 300 percent. 126 In 1987, faced with fiscal concerns over the
rising costs of Medicaid, Oregon restructured its Medicaid coverage to
exclude organ transplants. 127 The rationale behind Oregon's shift in
services presupposed that the existing United States system also rations
health care.128 In theory, the Oregon approach seemed a reasonable al-
temative to the existing U.S. system; in practice, however, the pitfalls in
the Oregon system became apparent. 129
Failure of the transplant-rationing experiment forced the Oregon
legislature to reevaluate its original policy decision to eliminate trans-
plants from coverage. John Kitzhaber, then-President of the Oregon Sen-
123 See Vanchiere, supra note 120, at 405.
124 See id.
125 See id. at 406.
126 See Eric L. Robinson, The Oregon Basic Health Services Act: A Model for State Re-
form?, 45 VAND. L. REv. 977, 988 (1992). In 1965, states expended about 5 percent of their
budgets on Medicaid. In contrast, it was estimated that in 1995 Medicaid expenditures would
rise to 15 percent of state budgets. Id.
127 See id. The exclusion of organ transplants from Medicaid coverage was Oregon's first
experience with rationing health care services. The state legislature recognized that the money
saved ($1,100,000) on thirty-four transplants would be better spent providing basic health and
prenatal services to fifteen hundred pregnant women. See Robinson, supra note 126, at 988-
99.
128 See Marsha F. Goldsmith, Oregon Pioneers "More Ethical" Medicaid Coverage With
Priority-Setting Project, 262 JAMA 176 (1989). The United States rations health care to the
extent that access is not universal. As a result, with respect to health care, it is people that are
rationed and not services. See David M. Eddy, What's Going on in Oregon?, 266 JAMA 417,
418 (1991). Two other ways in which it has been claimed that health care is rationed in the
present system are by age and by "inappropriate and ineffective application of resources."
Vanchiere, supra note 120, at 412 n.43 (citing BUREAU OF NAT'L. AFFAIRs, SPEciAL REPORT:
OREGON PLAN SPARKS DEBATE 172 (1990)). The fact that one half of the Medicaid budget is
spent on care for people in their last thirty days of life is evidence of the latter type of ration-
ing. See id.
129 In 1988, Oregon refused to fund the bone marrow transplant of seven-year-old leuke-
mia patient Coby Howard. Despite the Howard family's ability to raise 70 percent of the
$100,000 cost of the transplant, the state reasoned that because Coby was not in remission he
was not a strong candidate for the transplant. Ultimately, Coby died without receiving the
bone marrow transplant. See Harvey D. Klevit et al., Prioritization of Health Care Services; A
Progress Report by the Oregon Health Services Commission, 151 ARCH. IrrrERN. MED. 912
(1991).
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ate, claimed, "we had no framework for making the decision."'130 The
governor then appointed the Governor's Commission on Uncompensated
Care, a special task force, to evaluate the state's health care system.' 3 '
The result of the Commission's study was passage of the Oregon Basic
Health Services Act ("OBHSA") in 1989,132 created to "ensure equitable
access without excessive burdens to an adequate level of health care for
all Oregonians."'1 33
2. Legislation
Simply put, OBHSA rations health care.'34 The state policy behind
the act was to "keep all Oregonians healthy," rather than simply provid-
ing them with access to health care. 135 In order to achieve this goal, the
OBHSA established a three-pronged plan to provide basic health care
services to virtually all Oregon residents.' 36 First, Senate Bill 27, known
as the Oregon Medicaid Demonstration Project,137 established the
scheme under which medical services would be distributed among Ore-
gon residents.' 38 Second, Senate Bill 534 created a high risk, state-subsi-
dized insurance pool for the uninsurable and the chronically ill. 139
Finally, Senate Bill 935 mandated that employers provide employees and
their dependents with a minimum level of health insurance. 140
130 Julie Rovner, Oregon Plan Sparks Emotional Debate over Rationing Health Care, 49
CONG. Q. 1278 (1991).
131 See Vanchiere, supra note 120, at 412.
132 See id at 421. The OBHSA consists of three bills that are codified at Or. Rev. Stat.
414.705-.750 (1990).
133 Vanchiere, supra note 120, at 422.
134 See Stio, supra note 1, at 358. "Rationing is a health care reform theory that entails
controlling costs and extending insurance coverage to a greater number of people by limiting
the amount of care an individual receives and using the savings to fund basic health services
for others who are insured." Il at 358 n.138.
The idea of rationing health care on the basis of services produced a great deal of criti-
cism early on, as people thought that it devalued the importance of life and discriminated
against the poor (who would no longer receive the same level of benefits they were granted
prior to the act). See id. at 359 n.143.
135 Vanchiere, supra note 120, at 406 n.11 (citing John Kitzhaber, Presentation to the
Conference on Health Care: The Oregon Solution 1, 13 (Aug. 9, 1991) (transcript on file with
the Journal of Contemporary Health Law & Policy)). Health care is only one of many factors
that influence health. The Oregon legislation was an attempt to develop "not simply a health
care policy, but a health policy: an integrated approach in which resources allocated for health
care are balanced with allocations in related areas which also affect health care." Id.
136 See Robinson, supra note 126, at 990.
137 See id.
138 See id.
139 S. 534, 66' Leg. (Or. 1989) (codified as amended in scattered sections of OR. Rnv.
STAT. Ch. 735 (Supp.1992)).
140 See Vanchiere, supra note 120, at 415. The minimum benefit package must be equal
to the services provided to Medicaid recipients. See Klevit et al., supra note 129, at 912.
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Senate Bill 27 also created the Oregon Health Services Commis-
sionl4l ("HSC") for the purpose of ranking all of Medicaid's treatments
and services. 142 The basis for prioritizing 143 the "condition/treatment
pairs" 144 is an examination of the benefit they provide to the population
served. In order to develop the final list of ranked condition/treatment
pairs, the HSC employed a "four step process for health resource alloca-
tion." 145 The first step was for the HSC to devise a prioritized list of
services.146 To accomplish this, the HSC was required to "solicit input
from the public and to build consensus on the criteria used in the priori-
tization process."147 Upon completion of the ranked list of services, 148
the HSC must submit the list to the legislature, which sets the budget.149
141 The Health Services Commission is an eleven-member board appointed by the gover-
nor, consisting of five doctors, a health nurse, a social worker, and four health care consumers.
OR. REv. STAT. § 414.715(1) (Supp. 1990).
142 Id. §§ 414.065(1), 414.720(3).
143 Prioritizing is the key innovation of the OBHSA. See Vanchiere, supra note 120, at
415-18. "In the face of budget constraints most states have set priorities concerning which of
the optional Medicaid services would be funded. Oregon's novelty is in ranking and prioritiz-
ing all health services covered by Medicaid, including services ordinarily considered
'mandatory services' under federal law." Vanchiere, supra note 120, at 415 n.78 (quoting
Michael J. Garland, Justice, Politics and Community: Expanding Access and Rationing Health
Services in Oregon, LAW, MED. & HEALTHCARE 67 (1992)).
144 "Condition/treatment pair" is a medical phrase classifying the diagnosis and treatment
of a specific disease or affliction. The Oregon list was created from the Current Procedural
Terminology Codes and the International Classification of Diseases. See John A. Kitzhaber,
Prioritizing Health Services in an Era of Limits: The Oregon Experience, 307 BrT. MED. J.
373 (1993).
145 See Garland, supra note 143, at 68.
146 A new list must be submitted to the legislature annually, so the number of condition/
treatment pairs may change, and the number of funded services may change as well. See
Kitzhaber, Prioritizing Health Services, supra note 144, at 376.
147 Robinson, supra note 126, at 991 n.130 (citing OR. REv. STAT. § 414.720 (1)-(2)
(Supp. 1990)). After forty-seven community meetings conducted by Oregon Health Decisions,
a consensus of thirteen health-related values emerged. These "community values" were
grouped into three categories: value to individual, value to society, and essential to basic health
care. See David C. Hadom, Setting Health Care Priorities in Oregon: Cost-Effectiveness
Meets the Rule of Rescue, 265 JAMA 2218, 2220 (1991). After the determination of the
categories, the HSC placed the treatments into each category according to its own judgment.
See Robinson, supra note 126, at 991.
148 The HSC ranked 709 condition treatment pairs into seventeen categories. See Gar-
land, supra note 143, at 68. Categories one through nine were deemed "essential," categories
ten through thirteen were mostly dubbed "very-important," and categories fourteen through
seventeen were classified as "non-essential." See Robinson, supra note 126, at 992. For a
complete list of the categories, see id. at 992 n.134.
In May 1990, the HSC released an initial list of sixteen hundred conditions. However,
this list was not used because the results did not comport with common sense (i.e., crooked
teeth were ranked ahead of early treatment for Hodgkin's disease). See id. at 993 n.138 (citing
Daniel M. Fox & Howard M. Leichter, Rationing Care in Oregon: The New Accountability,
HEALTH A'r. 7, 21-22 (1991)).
149 See Garland, supra note 143, at 68. The legislature funded the first 587 services in
1991. See Vanchiere, supra note 120, at 417 n.88. "For the vast number of treatments below
line 587, there is either no effective treatment, or the treatment only expedites recovery and
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The third step involves the Office of Medical Assistance Programs
("OMAP") requesting federal Medicaid waivers, and the agencies pre-
paring themselves to run the programs. 150 The last step is implementa-
tion of the plan across the applicable region.' 51
Additionally, under Senate Bill 27, income level is established as
the sole test for Medicaid eligibility. 152 Thus, any resident with an in-
come below the federal poverty line is eligible for Medicaid coverage. 153
Consequently, the state will fund as many services as it can afford under
the Medicaid budget allotment for the year.' 54 In the event of an in-
crease in the number of qualifying Medicaid recipients, the state will
reduce the number of funded condition/treatment pairs, rather than deny
coverage to residents in need.155
Senate Bill 534 calls for the creation of an Oregon Medical Insur-
ance Pool Board to formulate insurance risk pools.' 56 The purpose of
risk pools is to enable people who do not qualify for private insurance,
due to a pre-existing condition, to buy health insurance through the pool,
which spreads out the risk.157 Within these pools, the only criteria taken
into consideration when setting premiums are age and geographic loca-
tion. 158 Further reductions in the cost of premiums to high-risk individu-
als will come from placing surcharges on insurance companies who do
business in the state, and State reserve funds, when necessary. 159
Senate Bill 935 grants small business owners tax credits if they pro-
vide health insurance for their employees.' 60 To qualify for a credit, an
employer must make available an insurance package equal to state-
recovery would occur either with or without treatment." Richard C. Wopat, The Oregon
Health Plan: To Cover All Diagnostic Visits, 268 JAMA 790 (1992).
150 See Garland, supra note 143, at 68. The difficulty in obtaining the necessary federal
waivers is discussed at supra notes 95-113 and accompanying text.
151 See Garland, supra note 143.
152 See Vanchiere, supra note 120, at 415.
153 See OR. REV. STAT. § 414.036(2) (Supp. 1990). Federal poverty level for a family of
three is $991 per month. See Kitzhaber, supra note 144, at 375. Previously, the state had
provided Medicaid to 66 percent of residents below the federal poverty line. Edward Chen,
Oregon Wins OK to Ration Medical Care, L.A. Tvmms, Mar. 20, 1993, at 1.
154 See Robinson, supra note 126, at 991; OR. REv. STAT. § 414.720(5) (Supp. 1990)
(services will be funded to the extent that funding allows).
155 See Robinson, supra note 126, at 991; OR. REv. STAT. § 414.720(2) (Supp. 1990).
156 See Stio, supra note 1, at 361; OR. REv. STAT. § 735.625 (1993).
157 See Robinson, supra note 126, at 994; see also OR. REv. STAT. § 743.737(1) (1993).
An estimated ten thousand to twenty thousand uninsurable residents will be able to obtain
insurance through risk pools. See Fox & Leichter, supra note 148, at 11. The likelihood of a
person with a pre-existing condition bringing a claim typically makes it impossible for an
insurance company to set a reasonable premium. Risk pools spread the risk and costs by
increasing the premiums of a larger group of residents, allowing insurance companies to issue
policies to high-risk applicants. See Stio, supra note 1, at 362 n.151.
158 See Stio, supra note 1, at 361.
159 See Robinson, supra note 126, at 994-95.
160 See id. at 994.
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funded Medicaid. 161 The goal of Senate Bill 935 is to establish a means
for offering insurance to those residents who are not eligible for Medi-
caid and cannot afford private insurance. 162
Lastly, the Oregon Health Plan established statutory protection for
physicians who refuse to provide unfunded services. 163 The goal of this
legislation is to reduce the occurrence of medical malpractice suits and
thus drive the costs of health care down even further. 164
C. FLORIDA PLAN
1. Brief History of Health Care in Florida Prior to the 1992
and 1993 Acts
In Florida, the "Health Care and Insurance Reform Act of 1993"165
(the "1993 Act") was enacted to address the rising costs of health care
and the high percentage of individuals without health insurance. 166 Ac-
cording to 1993 statistics, approximately 2.5 million Floridians are unin-
sured 167 and the percentage of uninsured non-elderly residents is 22.9
percent as compared to 16.6 percent nationally. 168 Furthermore, 75 per-
cent of the 2.5 million uninsured Floridians are employed or are the de-
pendents of employed residents. 169
The numbers above, however, do not tell the whole story. Consider
further that the total health care bill in Florida rose by eight billion dol-
lars between 1991 and 1992.170 At the current rate, the health care ex-
penditure in Florida is expected to reach ninety billion dollars by the year
2000.171 This rise in health care costs is attributable in large part to the
cost-shifting associated with uninsured individuals receiving health
care.172 Uninsured individuals who cannot pay for their medical services
create losses for providers who treat them. These losses are covered by
161 See id.
162 See id. at 995.
163 See id.
164 See id.
165 1993 Fla. Laws ch. 93-129.
166 See Bruce D. Platt, A Summary of the Health Care and Insurance Reform Act of
1993: Florida Blazes the Trail, 21 FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 483 (1993).
167 STAFF OF FLA. H.R. COMM. ON HEALTH CARE, REPORT ON SENATE BILLS 1914, 2006,
1784, & 406 (1993) Staff Analysis 1 (final May 11, 1993) (on file with comm.) [hereinafter
HEALTH CARE STAFF ANALYSIS].
168 AGENCY FOR HEALTH CARE ADMIN., A BLUEPRINT FOR HEALTH SECURITY 11 (1992)
[hereinafter BLUEPRINT]. This places Florida third among all states in regard to its percentage
of uninsured non-elderly residents. See id.
169 See HEALTH CARE STAFF ANALYSIS, supra note 167, at 7.
170 See id. at E-1. In 1991, health care in Florida cost thirty-one billion dollars; in 1992,
the cost rose to thirty-eight billion dollars. See id.
171 See id. at E-1.
172 See BLUEPRINT, supra note 168, at 15.
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shifting the costs to insured individuals in the form of artificially inflated
premiums.173
2. Legislation
The Florida legislature enacted the Health Care Reform Act of 1992
("1992 Act') 174 to address the problems of increasing costs and decreas-
ing access. The Health Care and Insurance Act of 1993 was then
promulgated to improve upon and facilitate implementation of the provi-
sions of the 1992 Act. These acts, in tandem, establish managed compe-
tition' 75 as the delivery system for health care in Florida. Such managed
competition was first considered as a viable health care delivery system
by the Jackson Hole group. 176 The goals of managed competition are to
"promote the pooling of purchaser and consumer buying power; ensure
informed, cost-conscious consumer choices of managed care plans; re-
ward providers for high quality, economical care; increase access to care
for uninsured persons; and control the rate of inflation of health care
costs."1 7 7
173 See id. at 15. The premiums paid by insured individuals are artificially increased
because providers must account for their losses in treating uninsured patients. Because unin-
sured patients do not have full access to health care, diagnosis and treatment is usually
delayed, increasing the cost of care when it is ultimately provided.
174 See Platt, supra note 166, at 484-85. The 1992 Act included four major provisions to
achieve its stated purpose: 1) the creation of the Employee Health Care Access Act to reform
the small group health insurance market; 2) the creation of the Florida Health Plan to develop
strategies and implement goals relating to access, cost containment, health care regulation, and
insurance reform; 3) the creation of the Florida Health Care Services Corps, which was
designed to stimulate the provision of medical services in under-served areas; and 4) the crea-
tion of the Agency for Health Care Administration to streamline the regulation of health care
in the state.
175 Health Care A to Z, CONG. Q., Sept. 25, 1993, at 60. Managed competition is a health
care system in which insurance companies and health care providers create health plans that
compete with other health plans for large groups of consumers. Through managed competi-
tion, individuals are organized into large purchasing groups to buy insurance at lower premi-
ums. Health care providers, organized into networks, then vie for business. See i&
176 See Thomas Rice & Richard Brown et al., Holes in the Jackson Hole Approach to
Health Care Reform, 270 JAMA 11 (1993).
Boiled down to its fundamentals, the Jackson Hole approach to managed competi-
tion requires three major changes in the U.S health care system. First, regional
Health Insurance Purchasing Cooperatives (HIPCs) are formed to manage the mar-
ketplace for health care coverage, especially for small firms and individuals. Sec-
ond, employers and HIPCs contribute the same amount of money for coverage
regardless of which plan a consumer chooses. This provision requires limiting the
tax excludability of health benefits to the rate charged by the least costly qualified
health plan, so that premium payments above that level would be with after tax
dollars. Third, to level the playing field among all health plans, new rules make it
more difficult for plans to avoid enrolling high risk individuals.
Id. at 1357.
177 1993 Fla. Laws ch. 657, 738.
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The most distinctive feature of Florida's managed competition is
that participation is voluntary. Opponents of this plan argue that a volun-
tary system does not go far enough to guarantee universal access to
health care.178 Meanwhile, proponents claim that starting with a volun-
tary phase and creating a system that makes medical insurance premiums
less expensive without using excessive amounts of state money is the
proper way to undertake reform. 179
Florida's health care reform was also novel in that it was the first
state plan to set a timetable for providing health care for all state resi-
dents. 180 The 1992 Act, which created the Agency for Health Care Ad-
ministration,181 also established a two-phase plan for achieving universal
coverage. 182 Phase One is voluntary. It creates incentives for small em-
ployers to provide insurance to their employees by using purchasing
groups to achieve lower premiums. 183 Phase Two of the Act is only
employed if voluntary participation in Phase One fails to produce univer-
sal coverage. Under this phase, an employer mandate, similar to that
implemented in the Hawaiian system, requires that all employers provide
coverage for their employees. 184
Having established a direction in which to steer health care reform
through the 1992 Act, the Florida Legislature promulgated the 1993 Act
to create the mechanism by which the proposals would be imple-
mented.18 5 The 1993 Act created eleven Community Health Purchasing
178 See Rosalind Resnick, Florida Grapples with Universal Health Care, 12 Bus. &
HEALTH 56 (1992). Marshal Litvak, executive director of the Florida Health Care Campaign,
has said, "[a]sking businesses and insurers to voluntarily enroll in health care reform is like
asking people to voluntarily pay their income taxes. It just will not happen." Id.
179 See id. at 56. The Florida system has also gained support because it seems to rely on
market forces and requires little bureaucratic interference. See Stio, supra note I, at 347 n.92.
180 See Sandra Greenblatt & Michael J. Cherniga, New Florida Health Reform Plan is
First Large Scale Test of Clinton's Managed Competition Theory, 10 HEALTHSPAN 7 (1994).
181 See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 20.42 (1993). The Agency for Health Care Administration is
an "lI -member Governor-appointed department with responsibilities of regulating hospital
rates, licensing facilities and professionals, planning, reviewing hospital budgets, and oversee-
ing the health care reforms." Stio, supra note 1, at 348; see also supra note 168 and accompa-
nying text.
182 See Stio supra note 1, at 348.
183 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 627.6699(b) (1993); see also Stio, supra note 1, at 348 & n.99.
184 Id. at 349. If by December 31, 1994 the state's employees and their dependents do not
reach a level acceptable to the Florida legislature, coverage of a basic health plan will be
mandated. However, in no event shall the legislature consider any system of employer-man-
dated coverage unless it finds that the cost-containment goal has not been met and that man-
dated coverage is still necessary. Any implementation of legislation after December 31, 1994
shall consider the potential impact on employment levels and shall provide a mechanism
through appeal to the agency for an exemption to mandated coverage upon a showing of
hardship. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 408.006 (West 1993).
185 See Stio supra note 1, at 348.
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Alliances ("CHPAs") 186 to assist members187 in obtaining health insur-
ance by establishing purchaser pools and disseminating information on
the costs, quality, and efficiency of the available providers. 188 Because
of their size, 189 CHPAs are able to obtain volume discounts on health
services for their members and CHPAs make it easier for health care
providers to capture greater market shares more efficiently. 190 As a re-
sult, the economies of scale achieved by providers, regarding marketing
expenditure, are realized by consumers in lower premiums.
Membership in a CHPA is voluntary because the Florida legislature
did not mandate that employers provide health insurance to their employ-
ees under Phase One of the 1992 Act.191 Currently, businesses may join
CHPAs as either alliance members or associate alliance members. 192
The primary distinction between an alliance and an associate alliance
membership is the rate at which a member is entitled to purchase insur-
ance.193 Additionally, alliance members, because they are entitled to the
CHPA rates, must pay a small administrative fee, and offer a minimum
186 CHPAs are state-chartered, private, non-profit organizations that are designed to bring
members within a defined geographic region together to obtain better health insurance rates
than would be available to members on an individual basis. See Platt, supra note 166, at 485.
187 Members include small businesses (under 50 employees), state employees, and Medi-
caid recipients. See Platt, supra note 166, at 485, 487 (citing FLA. STAT. ANN. § 627.
6699(3)(w) (West 1993)). The statute states:
A small employer is defined as: any person, sole-proprietor, self-employed individ-
ual, independent contractor, firm, corporation, partnership, or association that is ac-
tively engaged in business and that, on at least 50 percent of its working days during
the preceding calendar quarter, employed not more than fifty eligible employees, the
majority of whom were employed within this state.
l
188 See Platt, supra note 166, at 485.
189 There are only eleven CHPAs throughout the state of Florida. See id.
190 See id. at 485.
191 See supra note 167 and accompanying text; see also FLA. STAT. ANN. § 408. 702(5)
(West 1993).
192 Small businesses, state employees and their dependents, and Medicaid recipients are
all eligible to become alliance members and to receive the benefits of purchasing medical
plans at the CHPA rate. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 408.702(3). For the State to participate in the
CHPA as an employer entity, a number of distinct requirements must be met. The Department
of Management Services must offer heath plans offered by all AHPs within the CHPA to all
state employees withing the district. See id. § 408.7042; see also Platt, supra note 166, at
488. Specifically, through one or many AIPs, the State must be able to make available at
least five HMOs, at least five preferred provider organizations, an exclusive provider organiza-
tion, and managed-care pure indemnity health plans. See Platt, supra note 161, at 488.
Big businesses that traditionally provide insurance to their employees are not eligible for
alliance memberships, but nevertheless can participate in the CHPA as associate members. In
fact, almost "any entity that is not eligible to become an alliance member is eligible to become
an associate alliance member. See id. at 488-89. The benefit of such participation is that
associate members receive information-on medical provider cost, participant satisfaction, and
quality of care-which is typically helpful during contract negotiations.
193 Associate members are not entitled to the CHPA rate. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 408.704
(West 1993).
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number of benefit packages based on the number of individuals they
employ.194
Since the CHPAs were established, the State has remained actively
involved in their operation through the Agency for Health Care Adminis-
tration ("AHCA"). Among the regulatory tasks of the AHCA have been
the development of state practice parameters for hospitals and physi-
cians, 195 the development of a standardized claim form for providers and
insurers, 196 and the establishment of minimum care standards for
CHPAs. 197 With these general regulations in place, the AHCA is respon-
sible for conducting performance reviews, 198 monitoring the CHPA's
conformance with state laws,199 and establishing a data system with re-
gard to information on provider price, utilization, patient outcome, qual-
ity and patient satisfaction. 200
More importantly, the AHCA has kept a close eye on the potentially
anti-competitive pricing schemes, which conflict with the very rationale
behind managed competition. Upon promulgation of the 1993 Act, there
was a fear that the creation of AHPs 20 1 might allow providers to realize
monopoly power, resulting in inflated prices.202
A second feature of the Act, the Accountable Health Partnership
("AHP"), is a conglomerate of health care providers and health insurance
carriers intended to offer health care coverage as a package to CHPA
members. 20 3 Only certified members of an AHP are allowed to negotiate
with a CHPA to provide insurance to the CHPA's members. Certifica-
194 See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 408.703(5) (West 1993). For example, employers with less
than thirty workers must offer their employees at least two Accountable Health Partnerships
(AHPs), whereas employers with over thirty employees must offer at least three AHPs to its
workers. Id.
195 Practice parameters are important in establishing the reasonable standard of care that
physicians must meet. See id. § 408.02. The legislature proffered that such standards would
"reduce unwanted variation in the delivery of medical treatment, improve the quality of medi-
cal care, and promote the appropriate utilization of health care services." Id. § 408.02(1). In
reality, such standards may reduce costs through an alternative means. The establishment of a
legal reasonable care standard may enable Florida to contain the cost of malpractice insurance
by creating greater certainty with regard to the adequacy of care.
196 See id. § 408.7071.
197 See id. § 110.123.
198 See id. § 408.704(3).
199 See id. § 408.704(1) and (3).
200 See id. § 408.704(5)(b)(1).
201 See HEALTH CARE STAFF ANALYsIs, supra note 167.
202 Mandating certification as an AHP member would necessarily eliminate all non-AHP
members from the pool of possible health care providers. In turn, this would allow AHPs to
set prices low-inducing employers to join CHPAs, thus destroying any external markets. At
that point, realizing monopoly power over the market, the AHP would be able to charge
whatever cost it wished. See Platt, supra note 166, at 491. To regulate this, the Act requires
the AHPA to oversee CHPAs to ensure that actions affecting market competition are not for
private benefit. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 408.7041 (West 1993).
203 See Platt, supra note 166, at 486.
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tion as a bona fide provider of health care insurance under the AHP crite-
ria requires that the provider be willing to become a Health Maintenance
Organization ("HMO") 204 or an insurance provider licensed by the De-
partment of Insurance.205
Once certified, an AHP provider is subject to a number of responsi-
bilities imposed by the State legislature.20 6 Most importantly, the 1993
Act requires all AHPs to offer both a basic health benefit plan and a
standard health benefit plan.20 7 Plans include coverage for the following:
inpatient hospitalization, outpatient services, newborn care, child care su-
pervision, care for adopted and handicapped children, mammography,
emergency care out of the geographic area, and hospice coverage when
appropriate.20 8 The purpose of these requirements is to guarantee CHPA
members certain services and to attract business by defining the parame-
ters of competition among AHPs to improve services and lower premi-
ums.20 9 The primary difference between the types of plans is the level of
coverage that they provide.2 10
204 See infra note 234.
205 See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 408.706(2) (West 1993). To gain certification, the AHP must
also demonstrate that it:
(a) Is licensed or certified with the [Department of Insurance] and the licensure
agency for participating providers;
(b) Has demonstrated the capacity to administer the health plans it is offering;
(c) Has the ability, experience, and structure to arrange for the appropriate level and
type of health care services;
(d) Has the ability, policies, and procedures to conduct utilization management;
(e) Has the ability to achieve, monitor, and evaluate the quality and cost-effective-
ness of care provided by its provider network;
(f) Has the ability to assure enrollees adequate access to providers of health care,
including geographic availability and adequate numbers and types;
(g) Has the ability and procedures to monitor access to its provider network;
(h) Has a satisfactory grievance procedure and the ability to respond to enrollees'
calls, questions, and complaints;
(i) Has the ability to use medical outcome data to educate network providers, update
utilization review procedures, and recommend modifications to benefit designs;
(j) Has the ability to recruit and retain health care practitioners who are minorities as
defined in 288.703(3), with special emphasis on recruitment and retention of Afri-
can-American health care providers; and
(k) Has the ability and policies that allow patients to receive care in the most appro-
priate, least restrictive setting.
Id.
206 For a list of requirements, see Stio, supra note 1, at 354 n.l 19; see also FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 408.706 (West 1993) for a list of requirements. The statute holds that any accountable
health partnership not in compliance with the requirements may have its designation as a
health care network suspended or revoked. IL
207 See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 627.6699(12) (Supp. 1992).
208 See id. § 627.6699(12)(b)(4) (Supp. 1992).
209 See id. § 627.6699(2).
210 See Platt, supra note 166, at 493. For example, a basic policy has an annual maximum
of $50,000, whereas a standard policy might have a lifetime benefit cap of $1,000,000. See id.
at 493 n.87.
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In conjunction with voluntary managed competition, Florida
planned to implement a Medicaid buy-in program and a MedAccess pro-
gram. MedAccess provides primary and preventive care along with cer-
tain mandatory insurance21 ' capped at $500,000 (for life)2 12 for eligible
residents. 213 The Florida legislature provided for the MedAccess pro-
gram to be paid for through the collection of premiums,21 4 while health
care reimbursements would take place at the appropriate Medicaid
rates.2 15 This system promised to reduce the cost of providing health
care to eligible residents by using the existing provider structure in a
more efficient way.2 1 6
The final component of Florida's reform effort is the realignment of
the state's Medicaid program, through the creation of the Medicaid buy-
in program.2 17 Under the program, eligible residents must contribute a
small amount to the premium, determined by an income-based sliding
scale.2 18 The buy-in program was established to subsidize health care for
individuals who are not eligible for Medicaid but cannot afford health
insurance (namely, those residents with incomes between the federal
poverty level and 250 percent of the federal poverty level).2 19 The Medi-
caid buy-in program is the only part of the Florida plan that requires a
federal waiver.
D. TENNESSEE PLAN
1. Brief History of Tennessee Health Care Prior to
Implementation of TennCare
As was the case with the other states in this survey and most states
across the country, Tennessee faced problems of rising health care costs
and diminishing access to quality care.220 These problems were exacer-
bated by the state's inability to bring the medical services problem under
211 See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 408.904(2) (West 1993).
212 See id. § 408.905(5).
213 Eligibility is based on the following requirements: 1) family income must be equal to
or below 250 percent of the federal poverty level (250 percent of the federal poverty level for a
family of four in 1993 was approximately $36,000. See Association of Voluntary Hospitals of
America, CHPAs: Florida's Prescription for Health Care Reform: 20 of the Most Asked Ques-
tions About the 1993 Reform Bill, at question 8 (1993)), 2) must have been without health
insurance for the last year, and 3) cannot otherwise be eligible for Medicare or Medicaid. See
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 408.903(1)-(3) (West 1993).
214 See id. § 408.908(7).
215 See id. § 408.906(2).
216 See Platt, supra note 166, at 493-94.
217 See Stio, supra note 1, at 357.
218 See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 409.914 (West 1993).
219 See id. § 409.914(2)(a).
220 David M. Mirvis, M.D. et al., TennCare-Health System Reform for Tennessee, 274
JAMA 1235 (1995). Medicaid costs rose from $692 million in 1988-1989 to $2.7 billion in
1993-1994. The number of recipients grew from 540,000 to 1,000,000 in the same time pe-
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control. Thus, the rapid growth in Medicaid enrollment~was a reflection
on the inability of Tennesseeans to afford private health insurance and
not on the comprehensive nature of the State's health coverage. 221 Faced
with these problems, the Tennessee legislature explored three different
options before arriving at TennCare as the State's health delivery system.
Initially, the Tennessee legislature contemplated an increase in taxes
accompanied by a restructuring of the tax burden as a source of funding
for the state health care delivery budget.222 The proposal called for the
imposition of a tax on hospitals and other professional health care deliv-
ery agents. Not surprisingly, the idea was met by vigorous opposition
from powerful health care lobbyists. 223 Ultimately, the taxation option
was rejected because it posed too great a financial burden on a relatively
poor state.224
A second option was to reduce either the number of services pro-
vided, or the reimbursement rates for those services, without affecting
the state delivery or finance systems.225 This, however, did not comport
with the state's goals of increasing access and controlling costs while
providing a comprehensive set of services. To the contrary, implement-
ing such a system would have shifted the cost of financing health care to
the privately insured, while reducing Medicaid patient's access to treat-
ments and raising the absolute fee (as compared to the Medicaid reim-
bursement fee) for medical services. 226
The final solution reached by the Tennessee state government was
TennCare227-a comprehensive reform of the State's health delivery and
finance systems. 228 An important difference between the Tennessee
health care plan and that of other states is the fact that although Tennes-
see's plan may be facially similar, in practice it has not made universal
health care coverage an explicit goal.229 Interestingly, the Tennessee ap-
riod. As a result, Tennessee ranked eleventh in number of Medicaid enrollees and seventeenth
in total Medicaid expenditure among the fifty states. See id.
221 In fact, despite the growth in enrollment, 470,000 residents had no health insurance in
1993. Mirvis et al., supra note 220, at 1235.
222 See id. Tennessee does not have a state income tax. See id. As such, the significance
of such a tax increase would be significantly less than expected in other states.
223 See id. The federal government also restricted this sort of financing, placing an even
greater burden on the state's plan. See id.
224 See id. Tennessee's mean per capita income ranks 36th among the states. See U.S.
BuREAu OF Trm CENsus, STATISTICAL ABsTRAcr OF T=m UNIrED STATEs 1993 (1994).
225 U.S. BuREAu OF Tim CENsus, STATIsTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 1993
(1994).
226 See Mirvis et al., supra note 220, at 1235-36.
227 TennCare became effective state law on January 1, 1994. TennCare Medicaid Pro-
gram Goes into Effect in Tennessee, BNA HEALTH CARE DAiLY, Jan. 13, 1994, at 1.
228 See Mirvis et al., supra note 220, at 1236.
229 The goal was to provide comprehensive health insurance at a cost borne by the state
government for all Tennessee residents who could not obtain it by traditional means. See id. at
19981
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proach regulates both the supply and demand of health care by fixing the
amount of money committed to the program for a given year and placing
similar pre-defined restraints on the group of people recognized as
beneficiaries. 230
In order for TennCare to be implemented, Medicaid waivers from
the federal government were required. Similar to the Oregon Project,
Tennessee submitted its waiver to the Health Care Financing Administra-
tion under section 1115 "research and demonstration" projects. Legisla-
tors hoped to gain the necessary waivers by September 1993 in order to
facilitate implementation by the January 1, 1994 deadline.231 Although
the HCFA did not grant Tennessee its Medicaid waiver until late Novem-
ber 1993, the plan went into effect, as scheduled, on January 1, 1994.232
2. Legislation
TennCare has been called the "boldest health care reform that any
state has ever undertaken." It is based on the premise that opening enroll-
ment to all of the state's Medicaid and uninsured residents (both above
and below the poverty line) will create a large enough pool of benefi-
ciaries to defray the cost of insuring high risk residents. Such an initia-
tive would not have appeared so bold had the legislature not
simultaneously capped the amount of money spent on the program by
both the state and federal government. These two factors in concert are
what make TennCare unique.
To achieve universal access, TennCare established a maximum en-
rollment of 1.775 million people.2 33 Among those eligible for coverage
under the program were former Medicaid patients,234 formerly uninsur-
able patients (on the basis of pre-existing conditions), and people who
were not formerly eligible for employer of state-sponsored health cover-
age. Upon Tennessee's application for a Medicaid waiver, the federal
government expressed concern about the program's ability to provide ad-
equate care for almost twice as many patients without substantially af-
1235. "The net result, it was hoped, would be to extend coverage to more citizens without
increasing taxes and public expenditure." Id.
230 See James F. Blumstein, Health Care Reform: The Policy Context, 29 WAKE FOREST
L. Rnv. 15, 40 (1994). Such a model has been recognized as a "hybrid" plan, commingling
notions of obligation and entitlement in order to justify the plan's existence. See id.
231 See Mirvis et al., supra note 220, at 1236.
232 Id. at 1239. Many blame the short amount of time between recognition and imple-
mentation as responsible for substandard delivery and informational systems.
233 See id. Had Tennessee reached a 1.775 million enrollment level for TennCare, it
would have covered 98 percent of the state population.
234 When TennCare was implemented, the Medicaid community was one million mem-
bers strong. See id.
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fecting costs. 235 As a result, the federal government required Tennessee
to lower its enrollment cap to 1.4 million people. 236
Similar to Florida's program, the Tennessee legislature divided the
state into regions for the purpose of administrating the delivery of health
care. The Community Health Agency Act created twelve regions state-
wide. A Managed Care Organization ("MCO") 237 has the right to choose
which regions it would like to compete for patients, but once it has made
that determination, it may not exclude any patient from enrollment be-
cause of a preexisting condition. 238 Under TennCare, MCOs, which may
be either HMOs or Preferred Provider Organizations ("PPOs"),239 must
be non-profit, private organizations licensed by the state to provide the
full range of services to all insured.240
Logically, after establishing this coordinated provider system, the
Tennessee legislature was required to establish exactly what services
would fall under "the full range of services" guaranteed to all enrollees.
Specifically, TennCare covers a wide range of inpatient and outpatient
services. Preventative care for beneficiaries up to the age of twenty-one,
comprehensive hospital and physician services, laboratory and x-ray
services, home health care, medications, medical equipment and sup-
plies, and emergency ambulance transport are all covered without lim-
its.24 1 Limited services include inpatient mental health and substance
235 See id. To ensure adequate care, the federal government required the state to provide
evidence that each participating managed care organization had a panel of physicians large
enough to treat all covered patients. Other safeguards included adequate informational and
quality assurance systems, and patient satisfaction evaluations.
236 See id.
237 A Managed Care Organization is an organization that coordinates the provision of care
to a group of insured individuals. Typically, the goal of these organizations is cost contain-
ment, and as such, they employ a number of different mechanisms for assuring that the cost of
care is cheaper than it would be under a similar third-party payer system. Examples of MCOs
are HMOs and PPOs. See infra note 239.
238 See Mirvis et al., supra note 220, at 1239. Only two of the state's twelve MCOs
accept patients statewide, and five MCOs only function in one region. See id.
239 See id. The distinction between BMOs and PPOs is that HMOs guarantee particular
rates to providers, whereas PPOs may adjust the rates they award providers if the reimbursed
amount exceeds the capitalization funding they receive from the state. As such, lIMOs shoul-
der most of the financial burden and risk of service, but PPOs pass that risk on to health care
providers. The regulatory consequence of this provider dichotomy is that HMOs are required
by state law to maintain a significant capital reserve while PPOs are not. Of the twelve ex-
isting Tennessee MCOs, eight are HMOs, but as of March, 1995, nearly two-thirds of all
TennCare participants were enrolled in a PPO, with Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Tennessee
covering nearly half (48.9 percent) of all TennCare patients. See id. at 1236.
240 See id. at 1236.
241 "TennCare covers a wide range of inpatient and outpatient services, such as prevent-
ative care ... limits." See id at 1237. Under Medicaid, the extent to which each of these
services was available was restricted. For example, Medicaid patients were allowed only
seven prescriptions per month and only twenty-four physician visits per year. See id.
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abuse treatment, as well as outpatient mental health services.2 42 Not cov-
ered under TennCare are long term care and Medicare premiums, which
receive the same level of reimbursement they had under the state Medi-
caid program.243
TennCare's financing requires that its members be subject to premi-
ums, copayments and deductibles on the basis of income.24 4 Residents
formerly insured by Medicaid and those generating incomes under the
federal poverty level typically do not have to pay a premium for their
services under TennCare.2 45 All other participants are required to pay
monthly premiums, copayments and/or deductibles on the basis of a slid-
ing scale, relative to their income.24 6 Carrier MCOs may throw partici-
pants who fail to pay their premiums out of the program.247
The bulk of the financial support for TennCare, of course, comes
from the state and federal governments. Thus, in order to obtain the
waivers necessary to implement the program, Tennessee had to convince
the HCFA that its proposal would be budget neutral 248 as far as the fed-
eral government was concerned.249 Recognizing that federal support
would be no greater than the state could have expected under Medicaid,
and that it was necessary to cap state payments to health care, the legisla-
ture was forced to devise a creative plan for insuring nearly 50 percent
242 See id. Also covered, but to a lesser degree, are inpatient mental health and substance
abuse treatments, as well as outpatient mental health services. Id. For example, in-patient
psychiatric care for adults under the age of sixty-five was not covered by Medicaid. Origi-
nally, Tennessee had proposed to provide this service without limits but was denied that op-
portunity by the federal government. See id. Recent developments have resulted in further
reductions in psychiatric services, which have prompted special interest groups to criticize the
state program. See id.
243 See id. These services account for nearly $1 billion per year. Id.
244 See id. at 1237.
245 See id. at 1239.
246 See id. The premium may not take into account anything besides age, gender, geo-
graphic region and income. In other words, factors such as pre-existing conditions cannot be
selected against under this fee scale.
Those individuals earning incomes at 200 percent of the federal poverty level or greater
may pay premiums equal to, or in excess of, the capitation rate. This, however, does not
render coverage useless because capitation rates only restrict payments to MCOs and not the
overall package of services the policyholder is entitled to receive. "All providers ... are paid
by negotiated rates; the state is not involved in establishing provider rates." Id.
247 This problem may make it impossible for Tennessee to ever achieve universal access
to health care.
248 Budget neutrality requires that the federal government expend no greater amount of
money on TennCare than it would have under the Medicaid plan, had it remained in effect.
See id. at 1239.
249 See id.
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more people 25 0-who would likely be less healthy as a group 25 1-with
approximately the same amount of money.252 The solution was an elab-
orate per person capitation system that discounted25 3 the payment sched-
ule the state would pay to each MCO.25 4
It is crucial to note that the distinctive feature of Tennessee's pro-
gram is that the budget is set independent of any anticipated number of
insured. The number of people that the state can provide coverage for is
then calculated from that number.255 In real terms, the state and federal
government agreed on a $2,192,950,800 budget for TennCare for
1994.256 From this total the state calculated an annual capitation rate of
$1641 per person257 and then discounted it to $1214.258 This formula
explains the increase in access to health care, but because it is not dis-
cussed in absolute dollars, it does not address the overall savings that the
Tennessee legislature promised as a result of the plan's adaptation.
Thus, the last feature of Tennessee's unique proposal was that the
real savings created by TennCare stem from the legislative requirement
that the state cap the program's growth rate at a rate equal to the ex-
pected growth rate of the state economy.259 In this way the state can
effectively reduce the annual growth rate of health care delivery from
approximately 18 percent to under 5 percent. 260
250 In its first year of implementation, TennCare capped its enrollment at 1.2 million peo-
ple, despite setting goals to cover 1.4 million. See id. at 1237.
251 Because TennCare provides insurance to previously medically uninsurable residents, it
is reasonable to believe that the addition of 400,000 enrollees of this character would create a
greater financial burden on the delivery system.
252 See supra notes 233-36 and accompanying text.
253 See Mirvis et al., supra note 220, at 1237. Discounts were taken for continuing char-
ity care, local government contributions, and average co-payments by beneficiaries. See id.
254 See id. at 1239.
255 Oregon also sets its state health care budget prior to allocating funds. The difference,
however, is that Oregon rations services while Tennessee caps the number of enrollees that its
plan can bear, without severely restricting the services to which they are entitled.
256 See Mirvis et al., supra note 220, at 1239.
257 The state compared this rate to the adjusted payments made for state employees in
1991-1992 ($1664) and Medicaid recipients in 1993-1994 ($1643), as well as the average
national individual premium rate for HMOs in 1993 ($1636), and argued that it was appropri-
ate. See id. at 1237-38.
258 See id. at 1237.
259 See id. at 1239.
260 The proposed Medicaid expenses for 1994-1995 were $3,965,900,000, for 1995-1996
they were projected to be $4,662,700,000, and for 1996-1997 they were projected to be
$5,498,200,000. Id. In contrast, the TennCare expenses were figured to be $3,176,600,000,
$3,331,800,000, and $3,496,700,000 for the same three-year period. Id. at 1238.
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IV. EXPLORING THE OPPORTUNITIES FOR "COOPERATIVE
FEDERALISM": AN ALTERNATIVE TO THE
FEDERAL SOLUTION
As demonstrated, federal solutions have been unable to remedy the
major problems plaguing the United States' health care delivery sys-
tem. 261 The federal government's inability to reach a consensus on a
national health care plan suggests not only that the differences between
the executive and the legislature are irreconcilable, but also that congres-
sional representatives remain adamant about individual interests. 262 For
these reasons, it may be assumed that most, if not all, comprehensive
federal proposals would meet a fate similar to that of President Clinton's
Health Security Act of 1993. In light of this, the following proposal
builds on the idea of "cooperative federalism." 263 It assumes that the
only way to obtain a consensus on health care in Congress is to allow
states to administer health care in a manner consistent with their individ-
ual needs, subject to the general mandates of the federal government.264
A. GOALS OF HEALTH CARE REFORM
It has been the premise of this paper that the most pressing problems
with the United States health care delivery system are limited access and
escalating costs. 265 In addition to these concerns, there are a number of
other problems that must be addressed by any comprehensive health care
reform. The most significant secondary concerns include quality assur-
ance,266 breadth of coverage,267 preservation of employee autonomy
261 See infra Part I.B.1; see also Beresford, supra note 28, at 1422.
There is an apparent public consensus that some health care reform is needed and
there is no dearth of ideas about how to accomplish it. But uncertainty surrounds the
durability of the consensus and the ability of Congress to produce a plan that will
substantially remedy agreed upon problems of inadequate access and high costs.
Id.
262 Notwithstanding the obvious schism between the Republican and Democratic solu-
tions discussed above, each state's representatives advocate personal agendas specific to the
needs and desires of their constituents. See generally LaGuarda, supra note 63, at 170 (noting
that states are only one of many interests represented in Congress).
263 See supra Part I.B.2; see also Holloway, supra note 23.
264 See id.
265 See supra Part I.A. See generally Note, supra note 11, at 1327 (arguing that private
restructuring of the health care delivery market is the cause of rising health care costs and a
growing number of uninsured).
266 Marc A. Rodwin, Conflicts in Managed Care, 332 N-w ENG. J. MED. 604, 604
(1995). See also Marc A. Rodwin, Consumer Protection and Managed Care: Issues, Reform
Proposals, and Trade-Offs, 32 Hous. L. REv. 1321, 1332 (1996). "Many quality problems in
managed care probably also flow from the failure of the organizations to review medical deci-
sions or ensure quality in other ways." Id.
267 Breadth of coverage is an illusive concept that implicates access to medical services,
generally, as well as those specific services that are made available. See generally Mark A.
Rodwin, Symposium on Consumer Protection on Managed Care: Mechanisms of Consumer
[Vol. 7:871
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(with regard to health benefits), 268 and protection of the medical profes-
sion.269 These related concerns consistently frustrate the implementation
of a national health care policy. Further, each of these issues reflects a
concern of a distinct sector of society and demand important considera-
tion in formulating national health care reform. The achievement of cer-
tain goals will not necessarily subvert the need to address the others.
1. Quality Assurance
It has been the longstanding foundation of the medical profes-
sion that the best interests of the patient are paramount to any other
concern.270 Initially, the ethical standards at the heart of medi-
cal practice were developed and regulated by clinicians. This pro-
longed era of self-regulation coincided largely with the dominance
of fee-for-service payment 9chemes. 271 Self-regulation, in conjunc-
tion with various legal remedies arising under both contract272 and
Protection-the Marketplace and Regulation: Managed Care and Consumer Protection: What
Are the Issues?, 26 Sa-rON HALL L. Rv. 1007 (1996). "Most HMOs and some PPOs shift part
of their financial risk for providing services to doctors, giving them an incentive to make
frugal use of diagnostic tests, referals, and hospitalization." Id. at 1012.
268 "More than two-thirds of the employees in this country have no choice in which medi-
cal plan they receive." Stio, supra note 1, at 324 n.8 (citing Release to State Hospital Admin-
istrators on the Clinton Plan-Health Security Act, on file with the Seton Hall Legislative
Journal).
269 See Beresford, supra note 28, at 1421-22 (relating the restrictions that the Clinton
HAS would place on physicians); see also Barry M. Manuel, M.D., F.A.C.S., Physician Lia-
bility Under Managed Care, 182 J. Am. CoLL. Stmo., 537-46 (1996).
270 See generally Edward B. Hirshfeld & Gail H. Thompson, Symposium: On Physician
Decision-Making and Managed Care: Medical Necessity Determinations: The Need for a New
Legal Structure, 6 HEAI MATr= 3 (1996). The American Medical Association adopted the
Hippocratic Oath, which emphasizes the obligation of the physician to put the patient's interest
first, shortly after its formation in 1847. See id at 6; see also Marcia Angell, Medicine: The
Endangered Patient-Centered Ethic, HAsnTiNs CENrER REP., Feb. 1987, at S12; Arnold S.
Relman, The Future of Medical Practice, HArH AmF., Summer 1983, at 5, 18 (physicians
should act as "fiduciaries or representatives for their patients in evaluating and selecting the
services offered by the health care industry.").
271 Michael J. Malinowski, Capitation Advances in Medical Technology and the Advent
of New Era in Medical Ethics, 22 AM. J.L. & MED. 331, 334 (1996). During the era of self-
regulation, medical ethics were delegated to the province of practicing clinicians. Ethical con-
cepts were used to generate codes of professional conduct enforced by the profession itself,
primarily through boards and institutional proceedings. Patient well-being as defined in a
'highly paternalistic and authoritarian fashion' and beneficence-the best interest of the pa-
tient as determined by his or her caregiver-served as the guiding principle. Id. (citing Mark
A. Hall, Rationing Health Care at the Bedside, 69 N.Y.U. L. REv 693, 728 (1994)).
272 Initially courts developed the notion of an implied contract between a doctor and her
patients. See Hirshfield & Thompson, supra note 270, at 9. This implied contract action
saddled physicians with a fiduciary duty toward their patients. Id. (citing 61 AM. JUt. 2D
§§ 166-173 (1981)). 'The origin of this duty is the ethical obligation of the physician to make
concerns for the patient the physician's first consideration, and the obligation of the physician
to do all that is possible to benefit the patient" lad at 9.
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tort,27 3 provided patients with adequate protection from incompetent, or
unethical, doctors.
The creation of Medicaid, Medicare, and managed care, however,
has had a dramatic effect on the delivery of medical services. These
systems have significantly altered the payment schedules of physicians
delivering medical services to plan members. Under each of these pro-
grams, physicians are no longer able to charge all patients the market rate
for services. In fact, in the case of many managed care organizations,
services were no longer the standard by which to determine payment.274
Instead, physicians were compensated on a per patient basis.275 The
changed dynamic forced physicians to alter their collective notion of ade-
quate care.2 7 6 In the managed care world, physicians reap the largest
rewards for practicing "assembly-line medicine.127 7 Assembly-line
medicine demands that physicians spend less time with each individual
patient, because profits are linked directly to the number of patients
served, notwithstanding the quality of care provided. The clear eco-
nomic implications of managed care for physicians were less care for
each individual patient, but more patient care in the aggregate.
If one accepts the idea that quality of care is in some way tied to the
amount of time that a physician spends with a patient, then it seems clear
that managed care plans tend to reduce the level of the quality of care
273 Id. A physician must apply the care and skill commonly possessed by a member of
the profession in good standing. Typically, each side will introduce evidence about the stan-
dard of care, and the court will decide what that standard is for the particular case. In the case
where a physician does not provide all of the necessary care, the court must determine the
following: 1) what medical care would have benefited the patient, and 2) whether that benefit
would have been significant enough to provide in light of all other considerations. See id.
274 Under the traditional fee for service model of health care delivery, many HMOs be-
lieved that physicians had an incentive to provide too much health care because they were paid
according to services rendered. See Stephen R. Latham, Regulation of Managed Care Incen-
tive Payments to Physicians, 22 Am. J.L. & MED. 399, 402 (1996). More common managed
care schemes involve either salary or capitation payments. See id.
275 Capitation is a system under which a physician is paid a fixed amount per patient per
month. In return, the physician agrees to provide all of the necessary services, irrespective of
their ultimate cost. See id. (citing HCFA Final Regulations, 61 Fed. Reg. at 13,432; HCFA
Proposed Regulations, 57 Fed. Reg. at 59,026).
276 Marc A. Rodwin, The Marketplace and Regulation: Managed Care and Consumer
Protection: What Are the Issues?, 26 SETON HALL L. REv. 1007, 1011 (1996). "Most HMOs
and some Preferred Provider Organizations (PPOs) shift part of their financial risk for provid-
ing services to doctors, giving them an incentive to make frugal use of diagnostic tests, refer-
rals, and hospitalization. Physician risk sharing can bias physician judgment and lead doctors
to deny appropriate services." Id.
277 Assembly-line medicine is the term I use for providing as little care to as many people
as possible. Under a system of capitation, a physician is rewarded for the number of patients
he is responsible for, not the amount of care that he provides. Thus, the physician has an
incentive to see as many people as he possibly can. This creates the appearance of practicing
medicine on an assembly-line, where the physician passes patients through as quickly as
possible.
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administered.278 Nevertheless, proponents of managed care put a slightly
different spin on this argument. They insist that insurance, generally,
creates the problem of moral hazard-artificially raising the standard of
adequate care.279 Their rationale is that in a third party-payer system
patients are more likely to accede to care that they would refuse if they
had to pay for it themselves.280 This potential undesirable incentive,
coupled with the other practical, financial and personal incentives,281 and
the fact that physicians have to administer a greater amount of care, re-
sults in patients actually receiving excess care in the fee-for service sys-
tem.282 For the purposes of proposing a solution, it will be assumed that
both of these assertions are, in fact, viable.
Alternatively, it should be noted that there may be a second direct
correlation between reducing compensation rates and decreasing the
quality of care. Specifically, as capitation rates and negotiated medical
services contracts continue to handcuff the invisible hand of the free mar-
ket for health care, the monetary incentive to practice medicine dimin-
ishes. The consequence of this reduced monetary incentive is that some
individuals with the greatest potential will self-select themselves out of
the pool of medical school candidates, thus lowering the quality of medi-
cal care over time.283
278 This reduction in the time and amount of services rendered by physicians is the ex-
press intent of managed care. Some commentators argue that it actually increases the level of
quality. For example, see Francis H. Miller, On Physician Decision Making and Managed
Care: Capitation & Physician Autonomy: Master of the Universe or Just Another Prisoner's
Dilemma? What Can Britain's National Health Service Experience Teach Us?, 6 HFa'TH
MAT=ix 89, 91 (1996). 'Provider capitation is marketed as a win-win strategy for coping with
both cost and quality problems perennially bedeviling the world's health care systems. It gives
physicians incentives to shop carefully when they exercise their economic power to order
clinical treatments for patients." Id.
279 See supra note 267.
280 Furthermore, the doctor is more likely to prescribe as much care as necessary, and in
some cases more, because he is not financially at risk for the ineffectiveness of the additional
units of care.
281 In a fee-for-service system, physicians get paid for the services they administer to
patients. Hence, the more services they provide, the more money they make. In administering
extra (excessive) medical care, physicians can also shield themselves from liability in the event
that something unforeseen happens to the patient.
282 This theoretical self-satisfaction has not yet manifested itself in the number of applica-
tions being filed for medical school.
Some commentators argue that there is a medically optimal and socially optimal level of
care that can be utilized in any given instance. Under a fee-for-service system, the medically
optimal level was favored. The expectation was that any treatment deemed to have a positive
marginal value was to be considered. Under a managed care system, the socially optimal level
of care is more appropriate. In this situation, a patient's medical needs are considered in
concert with those of the rest of the patient population, and the scarce health care resources are
administered in their most cost-effective fashion.
283 Motivated by increasing their profit margins, managed care organizations and large
employers are constantly looking for ways to reduce the costs of providing medical care. One
of the most effective methods they have found to date is capitation. See infra notes 270-78 and
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2. Breadth of Coverage
The uncertainty associated with illness creates an incentive for indi-
viduals to acquire medical insurance. However, insurance does not sug-
gest security, per se. Security is related to the comprehensiveness of the
insurance policy. For example, an individual whose insurance package
does not cover hospital care has no assurance that he will not have to pay
a considerable portion of his yearly health care expense out of pocket.
Essentially, the greater the scope of coverage an insurance policy pro-
vides, the greater the security of the individual. As a result, premiums
increase at a rate commensurate with the scope of coverage. Thus, in a
world where individuals are faced with the reality of finite resources,
they must make difficult decisions about how much security (medical
coverage) to purchase. 284
The individual's decision, in most cases, will be directly impacted
by the policy provided by his employer (if his employer chooses to in-
sure), managed care organizations, insurance companies, and the govern-
ment. Historically, the interests of these parties have stood in direct
opposition to the individual seeking coverage.2 85 The success of an in-
surance provider is contingent on its ability to contain costs. 286 There-
fore, insurance companies promulgated physician reimbursement limits
as an additional cost-saving mechanism in conjunction with restrictions
placed on benefit packages. 287
For-profit managed care plans found that the restriction of benefits
could lead to generous profit margins.288  Although these institutions
may be reaping the benefits of a system that sacrifices overall public
welfare, they should not be made the system's scapegoats. The federal
government and large employers are equally culpable.289 By refusing to
establish a consistent federal minimum level of benefits for both insur-
ance companies and large employers and concurrently refusing to lift the
accompanying text. Capitation is effective at keeping costs down because it shifts the financial
risk of excessive treatments to physicians, thus encouraging them to consider the marginal
costs of additional units of treatment. See generally Andrew Ruskin, The Legal Implications
of Using Capitation to Affect Physician Decision Making Processes, 13 J. CoNTIMP. HEaLTH
L. & POL'Y 391 (1997). See also Universal Access to Health Care, supra note 11, at 1326-27.
Patients covered by third-party insurance in a fee-for-service system prospered because
their interests were aligned with doctors, with respect to treatment decisions. Specifically, the
fact that neither the patient nor physician bore the cost of treatment allowed the physician to
utilize every available treatment that produced or might produce even the slightest benefit to
the patient. See generally Stephen Latham, Regulation of Managed Care Incentive Payments
to Physicians, 22 AM. J.L. & MED. 399 (1996).
284 See generally Ruskin, supra note 283.
285 Id.
286 Id.
287 See infra notes 22-23 and accompanying text (discussing Medicaid and Medicare).
288 Id.
289 See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
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ERISA restriction on state legislation, the federal government tacitly en-
couraged large corporations to opt out of state-mandated health insurance
floors.290 Ultimately, low-income employees were forced to purchase
health insurance that was severely limited in scope.291 Limiting insur-
ance coverage for these individuals results in increased costs292 for the
rest of the privately-insured public (who are forced to pay for the unin-
sured services required by the growing number of underinsured). 293
3. Whither ERISA?: Limiting Large Employer Autonomy
The maintenance of ERISA suggests a federal governmental prefer-
ence for large employer autonomy in the area of employee benefit deci-
sions.294 Despite the fact that health care is seemingly easy to exempt
from the ERISA scheme, Congress has refused to recognize such an ex-
emption for health care. The result of Congress's decision to maintain
the scope of the ERISA preemption has been the protection of employer
autonomy and, typically, the frustration of state health care policy objec-
tives. 295 Congress has offered a number of rationales for refusing to rec-
ognize a health care policy exemption from ERISA. These rationales
include the following: 1) permitting state regulation of employee benefits
will create significant administrative difficulties for corporations that op-
erate in several states;296 2) recognizing an ERISA exemption for health
care reform implicitly recognizes the greater importance of employer
290 See supra notes 93-97 and accompanying text.
291 Id. Managed Care capitation systems operate similarly. The creation of a per patient
reimbursement rate made it considerably more difficult for physicians to shift costs among
patients. The theoretical consequence of a physician's inability to shift costs is the potential
creation of a "tiered" health care system. See generally E. Haavi Morreim, Economic Disclo-
sure and Economic Advocacy, 12 J. LEGAL MED. 275,288 (1991) (discussing the phenomenon
of "stratified scarcity" whereby "it is sometimes literally impossible for the physician to pro-
vide for the indigent patient the same level of care that the better funded majority receives.").
292 The cost increase may manifest itself in a number of ways, including tax increases,
raised premiums, or increased fee-for-services charges.
293 See Bodenheimer, supra note 9' at 634.
294 See generally supra notes 82-99 and accompanying text. See Groves supra note 83, at
619. "he courts are unlikely to interpret ERISA in a manner deferential to state health care
reforms if the interpretation interferes with national policies of uniformity and protection of
employee benefit plans-policies that emerge from a reading of the statute and its legislative
history." Id.
295 See generally Hancock, supra note 2; Groves, supra note 83; cf. Brown, supra note 93
(concluding that ERISA need not be amended for states to effectively regulate health care).
296 See supra note 86. "ERISA is intended to preempt the field for federal regulation, thus
eliminating the threat of conflicting or inconsistent state and local regulations of employee
benefit plans." 120 CONG. Rc. 29,933 (1974). ERISA was created to promote uniformity in
the treatment of corporations that operate in many states. Id. As such, section 514 states that
the Act supersedes "any and all State law insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any
employee benefit plan." 29 U.S.C. § 1144 (1994). See Margaret G. Farrell, ERISA Preemp-
tion and Regulation of Managed Health Care: The Case for Managed Federalism, 23 AM.
J.L. & Ma. 251 (1997); Stio, supra note 1.
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health care mandates,2 97 which run counter to one of the purposes of
ERISA;2 98 and 3) cracking large corporations' ERISA shield will result
in diminished efficiency due to reduced autonomy in their business
decisions.29 9
Compelling though they may be, these arguments should not end
the debate over the efficacy of ERISA preemption. Rather, state and
federal legislators ought to establish a balance between public health care
policy and private corporate interests. ERISA and national health care
policy need not be mutually exclusive. It is foreseeable that a regime
could be established under which employers maintain autonomy over de-
cisions pertaining to their business; but after making an affirmative deci-
sion to insure, they would be subject to state minimum benefit laws, thus
guaranteeing the sufficiency of employer-sponsored health care insur-
ance plans.30 0
4. Protection of the Integrity of the Medical Profession
In most cases, those forgotten in the battle over health care delivery
are the medical service providers. Under the current status of the law,
physicians are subject to unlimited liability for treating (or not treating)
illnesses on the basis of decisions that are overseen (and sometimes ulti-
mately made) by uninformed insurance agents. 30' Additionally, by plac-
ing direct incentives on physicians, managed care has strained the
relationship between physicians and patients, two groups whose interests
were commonly aligned under the fee-for-service model of payment. 302
29'7 Hawaii currently utilizes employer mandates to provide health care to the majority of
its citizens. As anticipated, the consequence of this regime is that Hawaii is considered one of
the worst states in the country to open a small business in. See Stio, supra note 1, at 339 n.58.
"Opponents of this method of financing health care argue that an employer mandate is a 'free
lunch' for the employees of this country and is simply an additional cost that will result in
small businesses laying off workers and instituting hiring freezes." Id.
298 See supra notes 88-90 and accompanying text; cf supra note 98 (noting that the
Supreme Court in Travelers suggested a narrowing of the interpretation of the ERISA preemp-
tion clause).
299 This argument recognizes the possibility that a limited ERISA exemption for health
care could lead to greater exemptions in the future, resulting in employer mandates and/or the
promulgation of state prescribed procedural requirements governing the decision-making
processes of large corporations.
300 See infra Part IV.B.4. At least two commentators have argued that "amending ERISA
would only confuse sincere federal efforts to design a national health care program." Hollo-
way, supra note 23, at 451.
301 See generally Hirshfeld & Thompson, supra note 270, at 11 (discussing the bar on the
corporate practice of medicine and other statutory safeguards, including the prohibitions on
fee-splitting and self-referrals).
302 See David Orentlicher, Health Care Reform and the Patient-Physician Relationship, 5
HEALTH MATRIX 141 (1995). Capitation and other methods of payment have forced physi-
cians to practice a "cost efficient" brand of health care that eliminates treatments with dimin-
ishing marginal utility. Utilization review is a system under which an MCO analyzes a
physician's treatment decisions to determine if he is practicing such "cost efficient" care even
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Not surprisingly, as managed care continues to present a viable form of
medical insurance, the physicians' predicament grows steadily worse.
Equally distressing for physicians has been the federal govern-
ment's unwillingness to allow them to protect themselves. Under anti-
trust law, physicians may not organize to obtain competitive prices303
despite the fact that the government does not place similar obstacles in
the way of insurance providers or purchasers, whom the government af-
firmatively assists in enhancing their bargaining position.304 As a result
of the artificial market dynamic created by the federal government, phy-
sicians are called upon to offer the best possible care to the most people
in the least time despite a lack of autonomy regarding treatment deci-
sions, limited resources and less compensation. As long as the suppres-
sion of physicians' interests persists, patients run the risk of receiving
less effective treatments, longer delays, and, most significantly, less
autonomy. 305
B. THE SOLUTION
The aforementioned issues complicate the process of arriving at a
viable health care delivery system. Nevertheless, an examination of the
systems outlined above presents all of the necessary components of a
realizable health care delivery system, within the context of "cooperative
federalism." As "cooperative federalism" suggests, the legislative bur-
den must fall equally on the state and federal governments. 306 The re-
maining sections outline the responsibilities of each governmental body
in the proposed system, concluding that federal oversight of state-admin-
istered health care delivery programs will provide the most efficient, cost
effective way to achieve universal access and simultaneously address the
additional concerns discussed above.
under a fee-for-service payment plan. See Brian P. Battaglia, The Shift Toward Managed Care
and Emerging Liability Claims Arising From Utilization Management and Financial Arrange-
ments Between Health Care Providers and Payers, 19 ARK. Lrrnmm ROCK LJ. 155 (1997).
303 State and federal laws bar physicians from the corporate practice of medicine. The
impetus for this sort of legislation was a recognition of the conflicting loyalties held by physi-
cians and corporate directors and officers. The latter must act in the best interest of the share-
holders, while the former must act in the best interest of the patient (read: consumer). See
generally H-irshfeld, supra note 270, at 11. Similarly, physicians are not allowed to engage in
self-referrals or fee-splitting. See id. at 11-15.
304 HMOs were originally created by federal legislation. See Battaglia, supra note 302, at
174. Over a ten-year period between 1973 and 1983, the U.S. government provided over $350
million to finance -IMOs. See id.
305 See generally Rodwin, Consumer Protection, supra note 266.
306 Two commentators have proposed a similar sort of cooperative approach. See Hollo-
way, supra note 23; Farrell, supra note 293.
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1. Role of the Federal Government
The federal government's role in the proposed system will be two-
fold. First, the federal government will be responsible for establishing
guidelines and promulgating laws which facilitate state administration of
health care. Second, the federal government should provide financial
assistance to states administering health care in concert with this propo-
sal. Specifically, this advisory role would require the creation of: 1) a
federal law mandating that all states provide a minimum benefits pack-
age based on a federally-determined dollar figure, derived from per cap-
ita cost of living estimates for the states; 2) a federal ERISA exemption
for health care, allowing states to create minimum benefits packages that
apply to all insurers; 3) automatic Section 1115 Medicaid waivers for
states to broaden utilization of managed care in Medicaid; 4) a federal
law mandating that all self-insuring employers with operations in five or
more states respect the minimum benefit laws of either their state of in-
corporation, or their principle place of business; and 5) a federal limit on
malpractice liability for doctors, or an explicit, objective "reasonable
care test" to determine liability.
a. A Federal Law Mandating that All States Provide Minimum
Benefits Packages
A great health care mystery in the United States is the absence of a
federal law mandating minimum benefits. The establishment of such a
law must be the first step toward comprehensive health care reform.307 It
is essential because without such a law states and insurance providers
alike necessarily remain in the dark about the appropriate level of bene-
fits to provide purchasers. Furthermore, much of the delay built into the
waiver applications processes for both Medicaid and ERISA waivers is
the result of states' inability to approximate federal prerogatives concern-
ing appropriate levels of benefits. 308
A federal minimum level of benefits is not novel to the health care
agenda.309 However, such a minimum is usually presented as a package
307 Farrell argues that there may be a need for "nationally uniform policy determinations
with regard to problems of underutilization provider selection, rate setting, and solvency re-
quirements, but the federal government may not be the institutionally appropriate body to flesh
out and enforce those standards." Farrell, supra note 293, at 289. She proposes that this sort
of reform is a better alternative to the "fragmentary approach taken by Congress" to date. Id.
at 285.
308 See infra notes 99-116 and accompanying text; see also Rosenberg & Zaring, supra
note 38, at 547-48.
309 Clinton's HSA included a defined benefits package that included comprehensive cov-
erage. See Beresford, supra note 28, at 1410.
[The HSA] provides coverage for physician and hospital care, preventive services,
mental health and substance abuse services, family planning, hospice and home
health care, prescription drugs, and outpatient diagnostic testing and rehabilitation
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of services that must be covered by insurers.310 This note rejects the idea
that the legislation proposed should be in the form of an explicit list of
benefits. Instead, Congress should establish a minimum benefits pack-
age as a monetary amount. The price of the benefits package should be
determined by assessing the nation-wide average health care cost and
converting it into a percentage of the per capita cost of living. In this
way, the federal government retains the ability to determine the appropri-
ate level of care, without expressing an opinion about the specific bene-
fits insurers must provide.
b. A Federal ERISA Exemption for Health Care
Commentators have hotly debated the necessity of an ERISA ex-
emption for health care systems.311 The Florida model suggests that an
ERISA exemption is not the sine qua non of health care reform.312 How-
ever, there is evidence that the Florida model would function more
smoothly if an ERISA exemption allowed the state to regulate employ-
ers. 313 In addition, there is no reason to believe that providing such an
exemption would greatly infringe on the existing statutory right that
grants employers autonomy in deciding upon employee benefits.
An ERISA exemption for health care laws is necessary because
without the ability to enforce the federally-mandated minimum benefits
packages established above, such a law would be mere window dressing.
Under the present regime, states have the power to mandate particular
benefits, but ERISA allows employers to opt out of state regulation by
self-insuring. 314 With the health care delivery exemption in place, states
would be able to require all insurers, including self-insured employers, to
services. It also covers durable medical equipment and devices, vision and dental
care, and investigational treatments that are part of an approved research protocol.
Id. (citing H.R. 3600, 103d Cong. §§ 1101(a), 1111-1128 (1993)).
310 See id
311 See, e.g., Jessica Alicia Brown, ERISA and State Health Care Reform: Roadblock or
Scapegoat, 13 YALE L. & POL'Y Rnv. 339 (1995).
312 See supra notes 166-219 and accompanying text.
313 For a discussion of the process by which Medicaid Waivers are currently granted, I
advocate automatic waivers in order to expedite the process by which states can undertake
health reform. The current inefficiency that plagues the waiver process stems from the federal
government's expectation that states explicitly state their goals in achieving a Medicaid
waiver. I believe that simply demanding budget neutrality is an effective way to ensure that
states do not take advantage of the waiver process. Furthermore, in the absence of federally
mandated budgets, there is no actual standard by which the states can expect to be judged
during the waiver application process. See supra notes 310-14 and accompanying text for a
complete discussion.
314 Although most commentators agree that the current waiver process is in need of re-
form, many authors do not share the view that automatic waivers present the best alternative.
For a discussion of some of the other possible waiver reforms that have been proposed, see
Randall, supra note 100; see also Rosenberg & Zaring, supra note 38; Andersen, supra note
107.
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provide at least the minimum level of benefits federally, but only when
they affirmatively chose to provide insurance. This mandate would not
require the state to infringe upon the employer autonomy concerning the
decision about whether or not to offer employee benefits.
c. Automatic Section 1115 Waivers
Granting "automatic" Section 1115 waivers to states for "demon-
stration projects" is another way for the federal government to facilitate
the transition into a model of cooperative health care reform.315 Such
waivers should be granted to states that agree to implement Medicaid
managed care in order to expand the covered portion of the population to
include the presently uninsured and underinsured.316 The purpose of
waiving the requirements of Medicaid, as prescribed by the federal gov-
ernment, allows greater flexibility for the individual state to devise a plan
that increases the number of covered persons.317 Concentration on the
budgetary component of the application would limit the federal govern-
ment's expenditure on the program to a predetermined level.318
The Section 1115 waiver should be "automatic" upon the state's
ability to demonstrate the budget neutrality of its plan. In this way, the
federal government would be able to effectively utilize the states as labo-
ratories in which to explore the many possibilities for expanding the
scope of government funded health care, without sacrificing its own pri-
mary financial interest.
d. Federal Law Governing Self-Insuring Employers
The creation of an ERISA exemption for health care requires that
the federal government establish a set of rules clarifying the insurance
obligations of self-insuring large employers. As discussed earlier, there
is a concern among politicians, and business people alike, that large busi-
nesses operating in a number of different states would be subject to mul-
tiple benefit laws-creating administrative and economic ineffici-
315 The rationale behind granting automatic Medicaid waivers is similar to the rationale
behind carving out an ERISA exemption for state health care reform. Namely, permitting
states the flexibility to create their own individualized health care systems will ensure that
local concerns are at the center of most policy decisions. This will allow states to determine
more effective ways of providing adequate care to a greater percentage of their population.
316 See supra section II.B.
317 See generally Rosenberg & Zaring, supra note 38. Although the authors ultimately
disagree with the use of section 1115 waivers to promote the creation of new state health care
programs, they provide a good discussion of how the process works.
318 Budget neutrality guarantees that the states do not try to take advantage of the more
lenient Medicaid waiver standards. Such a requirement assures that the state plan does not
cost the federal government any more than it would otherwise be spending on health care,
absent such a waiver program.
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encies.3 19 While this rationale supports maintaining the ERISA preemp-
tion doctrine in its entirety, the importance of health care reform de-
mands that an exception be carved out. This proposal includes a law
mandating employers who operate in five or more states, and who may
be unwilling to comply individually with the requirements of each state
in which they operate, to comply with the minimum benefit laws of
either their state of incorporation or their principle place of operation.
Such a rule would create uniformity and predictability in health ben-
efits regulation, thus eradicating the necessity for ERISA preemption in
this area. Furthermore, this rule would not create perverse incentives to
locate in one state over another, because the federal government sets the
minimum benefit level. Thus, each state would be obliged to recognize
the supremacy of other states' health care laws. This would eliminate
any potential advantages a corporation could derive from establishing its
principle place of operation or place of incorporation in a particular state.
e. Federal Limit on Malpractice Liability
The final piece of statutory health care reform to be undertaken by
the federal government should be legislation limiting the liability of phy-
sicians who do not have exclusive autonomy over treatment decisions.320
The government has previously addressed legislation limiting the liabil-
ity of perpetrators of "federal torts," when Congress rewrote the liability
section of Title VII in 1991.321 This note proposes that limits be placed
on physician liability, similar to those imposed by Title VII on employ-
ers.322 In addition, where the insurer makes treatment decisions, either in
319 See supra note 298 and accompanying text.
320 Alternatives to limited liability have been proposed and would be equally effective.
The true goal of this limitation is to cap the liability of physicians who operate under financial
incentive arrangements with managed care organizations. Any system which incorporates the
HMO into the liability equation would be acceptable. Some examples include enterprise lia-
bility for HMOs, vicarious liability, ostensible agency, or respondeat superior. Under any of
these theories of liability, physicians would only be the primary risk bearer in situations of
gross negligence. See Manuel, supra note 269; Eleanor D. Kinney, Procedural Protections for
Patients in Capitated Health Plans, 22 AM J.L. & ManD. 301, 314-23 (1996); see also supra
note 301-05 and accompanying text; Latham, supra note 274.
321 The Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 1981A (1994).
322 The Civil Rights Act, in pertinent part, provides that:
(3) The sum of the amount of compensatory damages awarded under this section for
future pecuniary losses, emotional pain, suffering, inconvenience, mental anguish,
loss or enjoyment of life, and other nonpecuniary losses, and the amount of punitive
damages awarded under this section, shall not exceed, for each complaining party -
(A) in the case of a respondent who has more than 14 but fewer than 101 em-
ployees in each of 20 or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calen-
dar year, $50,000;
(B) in the case of a respondent who has more than 100 and fewer than 201
employees in each of 20 or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding
calendar year, $100,000; and
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whole or in part, he should bear the burden of indemnifying the injured
party in the case of any wrongful act.323 Such a scheme would comport
with the existing vicarious liability regime recognized under Title VII. 324
In the event that the federal government remains hesitant about ex-
pressly limiting the liability of physicians, an objective standard of rea-
sonable care may be adopted in its place. Such a standard, despite its
inability to limit liability, would provide physicians with a guideline for
acceptable medical practices. Assuming that a physician stays current
with what is deemed acceptable medical practice and adheres to the
guidelines when providing care, he should be able to anticipate his own
liability. This would result in lower malpractice premiums. Similarly,
the reduction of malpractice premiums would help offset the loss of prof-
its resulting from lower per capita reimbursement fees, thereby stabiliz-
ing the physician's bottom line profits.
2. The Role of State Governments
Under the proposed model, federal health care law would only pro-
vide the skeleton of the system. State laws would then be, used to fill in
the gaps to create a functioning health care delivery system. The neces-
sary state legislation includes the following: 1) state laws mandating
minimum benefits; 2) development of Medicaid managed care programs
in every state; and 3) establishment of voluntary purchasing alliances for
small businesses.
a. State Law Mandating Minimum Health Care Benefits
Package
The states will be individually responsible for selecting the particu-
lar benefits that comprise the minimum package in order to account for
geographically and demographically created differences. The procedure
for deciding the scope of coverage should resemble the state of Oregon's
(C) in the case of a respondent who has more than 200 and fewer than 501
employees in each of 20 or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding
calendar year, $200,000; and
(D) in the case of a respondent who has more than 500 employees in each of 20
or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year, $300,000.
Id. § 1981A(b)(3)(A)-(D).
323 See supra note 320. It is beyond the scope of this note to explain in detail the work-
ings of each type of liability. However, it should be noted that where MCOs are permitted to
shift risk, as through capitated payment schemes, there must be some federal regulatory struc-
ture in place so that companies do not place unreasonable burdens on the physicians they
employ. Furthermore, in the case of utilization review, physicians should not have to affirma-
tively demand or perform treatments that are declined by the MCO upon initial request. The
doctor's duty under this new payment scheme must be one of guaranteed diagnosis, not of
guaranteed treatment.
324 See supra note 322 (explaining liability under Title VII).
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model for determining the priority of condition/treatment pairs.325
Through this mechanism, the state legislature can insure public input into
the service included in the minimum benefits package. Such a system is
desirable because it can be presumed that the hierarchy of treatments will
differ to some extent across state lines. Further, this process allows the
residents of a particular state to take an active role in choosing the bene-
fits that they will obtain, thus creating a greater personal interest in their
health care.
Another advantage of this system is that it allows states to predict
the cost of health care more readily, with the minimum benefits package
providing a point of departure. This should prove particularly useful for
states attempting to create Medicaid managed care packages sponsored
by state and federal funds. The ability to anticipate the baseline per per-
son cost of the program will, in turn, allow the state to establish more
accurate estimates of the program's coverage capacity. In this way, the
state can reduce the risk that the program will fall into debt.
b. The Development of Medicaid Managed Care
The goal of universal access is well served by granting the states
freedom to create demonstration projects that increase the number of in-
sureds in state programs. Incorporating Medicaid into the managed care
system provides an opportunity to reduce costs and insure additional pa-
tients at the same level of expenditure. Low-income workers, who are
required to pay a premium, will be induced to enter the managed care
program in order to obtain health care coverage at reduced rates. The
return of this group of individuals to the program will allow states to
capture a greater percentage of the remaining consumer surplus, which
will necessarily create greater efficiency and consequent cost savings.
To accomplish the transition from Medicaid to Medicaid managed
care, states should look to Tennessee's model.326 TennCare raised the
percentage of insured residents by 50 percent, while containing costs at a
level approximating the rate of inflation.327 The Tennessee profile con-
tains no salient feature suggesting that the results of their demonstration
project were anomalous or state-specific. The most significant problem
that states should anticipate in implementing Medicaid managed care is
the potentially adverse effect it may have on physician enrollment num-
bers in the major state health plans. In Tennessee, the number of partici-
pating physicians dropped at an alarming rate during the early stages of
325 See supra notes 142-55 and accompanying text.
326 See supra Part llI.D.
327 Profiles of the population of the state of Tennessee suggest that such a demonstration
project could be effective under similar conditions in other states.
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TennCare's development.328 However, the number of physicians en-
rolled in TennCare currently resembles the level of participation in Medi-
caid that existed prior to TennCare's creation. 329 Nonetheless, the
federal government is in the position to protect states against reliving the
Tennessee experience. By enacting a law reducing or limiting the liabil-
ity of participating physicians, the federal government could provide am-
ple incentive for doctors to remain in the program. Such a law would also
reduce malpractice claims. Ultimately, such a system would be
favorable to physicians because every malpractice insurance dollar saved
enables them to retain a greater share of the reimbursements offered by
the plan.
c. The Establishment of Voluntary Purchasing Alliances
Finally, state law should establish voluntary purchasing alliances.
As the Clinton Plan suggested, managed care may be the most effective
economic delivery system to contain the costs in the health care industry.
The failure of the HAS, however, may have caused many politicians to
stop considering managed competition as a viable economic engine for
distributing private insurance at a relatively low cost. Still, in Florida, a
more conservative model of managed competition has proven to be an
effective way of achieving greater market efficiency. 330 The Florida
Health Care and Insurance Act of 1993 provides a workable model to
pool employer purchases of employee health care.331 Furthermore, the
voluntary aspect of Florida's plan makes it preferable to the employer
mandate systems of the HSA and the Hawaii model. 332
An important feature of the Florida model that should be adopted in
every state is the non-profit status of the purchasing alliance. 333 In this
capacity, purchasing alliances can truly concentrate on obtaining the best
health care benefits package, while for-profit insurance providers will
continue to concern themselves with the financial stability of the market.
328 See Mirvis, supra note 220, at 1240. "According to data collected by the [Tennessee
Medical Association] in December 1993, only 32.7% of the state's physicians had decided to
participate in Tennessee, while 40.4% had decided not to join .. " Id.
329 Id.
330 See supra Part III.C.
331 See supra notes 170-72 and accompanying text.
332 S. 231, 103d Cong. § 1321 (1994). The Mitchell Reform Plan embraces managed
competition as the method for increasing access to health care at the lowest possible costs. In
this way, it is similar to the Health Security Act. The primary difference is that the Mitchell
Plan is voluntary and for all employers, and it entitles larger employers (500 employees) the
opportunity to join alliances distinct from those organized for smaller employees. See Karen
A. Jordan, Managed Competition and Limited Choice of Providers: Countering Negative Per-
ceptions Through a Responsibility to Select Quality Network Physicians, 27 A=Z. ST. L.J. 875,
881 (1995). Cf Florida Health Care and Insurance Reform Act of 1993, supra Part III.B.2.
333 See supra note 186.
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Thus, this system assures that consumers' interests are not sacrificed for
the sake of profits.
CONCLUSION
The time has come for the United States to gain control of its unsta-
ble health care system. Although previous attempts by both federal and
state legislatures to efficiently regulate health care delivery have failed,
the United States should remember the power of unity. A problem as
endemic as the woes of the United States' health care system requires a
collaborative solution. The approach discussed herein effectively consid-
ers the most salient problems of our current health care system and pro-
poses a framework in which they can be solved. The ultimate success of
such a proposal requires the coordinated participation of state and federal
governments in the regulation and administration of health care services.
Hence, the only viable option for treating the ills that plague our health
care delivery system is a plan, similar to the one proposed above, that
coordinates the efforts of all actors in the pursuit of a solitary goal-
efficiently delivered, universal health insurance coverage.
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